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As we have entered the new millennium, characterization of the world’s
populace has evolved from a state of high birth and death rates to one of
low birth rates and prolonged life expectancy. That transition implicitly
recognizes the growth in the number and proportion of older persons and the
future prospects for an increasing prominence of this trend. Never before
experienced in recorded history, we have been struggling with this issue, what
it represents and how it should be addressed. The subject is important on many
levels in that it speaks to the standard of living that Canadians can expect to
enjoy. It further enjoins a self-perpetuating shift towards a knowledge-based
economy from a resource-based one where human capital is celebrated over
physical capital. 
The phenomenon has attracted considerable debate in Canada and abroad
since the 1990s. More recently, these debates have evolved to include increased
emphasis on policy consideration. The extent of attention devoted to the subject
has served to raise concerns and heighten interest on the part of the Canadian
public and policy-makers alike. Consequently, we are today more able to identify
and agree on demographic patterns and are likewise better equipped to under-
stand and deliberate potential social policy adjustments. 
Importantly, the policy agenda must be approached in a way that promotes
the inherent opportunities residing in the fact that the world population is
aging rather than dwelling on the perceived threats. Properly planned and
fairly implemented, proactive strategies can seek to preserve some fundamental
rights and privileges presently enjoyed by Canadians while concurrently
exploring policy shifts which can contribute to the lessening of predicted
burdens to individuals and to society. This balanced perspective should go
so far as to recognize that the coming retirement of the baby boom generation,
if accompanied by optimism and meaningful social policies, can in fact
generate opportunities to achieve major social and economic gains not
otherwise possible. 
In response to widespread interest and increasing relevance of population
aging to all spheres of life, the Certified General Accountants Association
of Canada (CGA-Canada) has seen it timely to release this paper. Intent
upon portraying current and expected population status, CGA-Canada’s
purpose and goal is to advance understanding, advocate for a win-win policy
which adjusts the normative framework to an older population and debunks
some common myths and apprehensions. In so doing, CGA-Canada would
advocate for proactive public policy which embraces the doctrine of “a
society for all ages” but which does not favour one generational group at
the detrimental expense of another. All the while, we must attentively and
Foreword10
unfailingly acknowledge that aging is part of the life process. Barring the good
fortune to discover immunity against aging, the business of demographic
adaptation is here to stay. 
Anthony Ariganello
President and Chief Executive Officer
The Certified General Accountants Association of Canada
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A growing number of older people face concerns in areas related to health, income
security, employment, housing and social welfare. Concurrently, growing fears
about retirement well-being can have profound effects on families, communities
and the economy as a whole. Recent works of the Canadian Labour Congress has
revealed that while 82% of a sample study of 1,003 adults conducted in March
2004 said that health care issues were their biggest concern, 72% said that their
second biggest concern was not having enough income after the age of 65 years.
Revealing in themselves, these statistics are even more indicative when we
consider that these concerns rank higher than crime fighting, environmental
protection, protection of Canadian jobs and corporate governance.
Justified or not, there is a perceptual consensus that individuals are at risk and
that this risk is heightened by the absence of enough younger people and workers
to systemically support the predicted mass retirements of the next 10 to 20
years. This is a natural and logical conclusion given that aging baby boomers are
approaching retirement age and that Canada’s birth rate is declining; in short, that
there is a smaller working-age population supporting a growing group of retirees.
On the heels of reported business failures, allegations of scandal, uncertain financial
markets and pension plan apprehensions,there is good cause for social trepidation. 
Importantly also, we would concede that unease over a shifting demographic
portrait is not reserved to those with modest means. To varying degrees, the
issues and implications affect all Canadians either directly or indirectly and
cannot be ignored. While many of the arguments publicly made may tend to
advocate for those with the most modest of means, we can expect that the
effects of an ill-resourced or shrinking fiscal or social capacity can permeate
into middle- and high-income families in the form of reduced government-
sponsored benefits and potential economic downturn. Everyone, individually
and collectively, is joined in a single human venture which seeks to improve
and maximize respective contributions and collective well-being. 
Upon reflection, one might be compelled to ask why we cannot simply
introduce increased wealth reallocation within a societal context. The answer is
simple. Canadians, even the affluent, are not particularly receptive to increased
taxation, regardless of its form. While arguments continue to be made that
financially advantaged Canadians are better off and have the ability and the
responsibility to assist their less-advantaged neighbours, simple adoption of such
a strategy is problematic. Rebuttals may well be abundant but the fundamental
reasons are that such an approach:
•  undermines the notion of capitalism and upsets incentive and reward culture;
•  violates proven and entrenched economic and productivity theory; and
•  disregards the relationship between effort and reward that people expect.
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If we are to ignore these values, a drastic departure is required to render us
a more socialistic state. On its face, this may not be a bad thing in that
increased life expectancy is a fundamental social goal and a good thing. If we
gauge how people are likely to react and behave in this notion of universality,
we can, however, expect to witness a change which could render the system
less financially capable and responsive than it is now on the premise that such
a regime could represent a system of disincentives for some. 
On a more pragmatic level, some Canadians will see poorly a shift in policy
which disadvantages them. This is especially true if they have planned and
successfully arranged their lives to align with current policy. We cannot now
simply charge them more for public services or reduce their universal rights
on the premise of ability to pay. While ability to pay is in part attributable to
good fortune, we would likely find that these individuals have made sacrifices,
concessions and hard decisions in the spirit of avoiding hardship or improving
their lot in life. In other words, it is not particularly reasonable to change the
rules because scenarios have changed. 
Admittedly, 20th century policy and attitude seems to have been designed
with a youthful society in mind. From this point, policy for all age groups
must be engineered with an aging society in mind, where as soon as 2007,
every third individual will be over 60 years of age. Society must begin now to
adjust and design infrastructures, policies, plans and resources which celebrate
increased longevity and reduce unnecessary dependencies. In some instances,
reshaping of Canadian culture and attitude may well be constructive. As we
pursue this endeavour, special care should be taken to minimize intergenerational
conflict, categorization and stigmatization. After all, aging is not defined by
chronological age alone, is non-discriminate and is neither linear nor static.
Policy makers would be encouraged to persist in the consideration of the full
range of dynamics and interactions between people of different age groups
and to frame policy using the life course as the unit of analysis.
1
Throughout the course of this paper, it will be our goal to impart upon the reader:
•  a sense of the current demographic distribution to which Canada is subject;
•  that identification of concerns and fears alone does not justify abandonment
of current public policy;
•  recognition that policies can shift so as to embrace the environment within
which Canadians plan and live their lives; and
•  an appreciation of the income devices available to retiring Canadians and
the ability to embrace retirement with greater confidence. 
In the Executive Summary of the report, it is our goal to present major
themes and considerations. Throughout the succeeding text, we will build upon
the highlighted concepts by introducing greater rigour, analysis, justification and
reflection. Serving as a synopsis of the discussion, the Closing Comments section
will highlight the more salient features and recommendations of this paper. 
1  David Cheal. “Aging and Demographic Change in Canadian Context.” Horizons Vol. 6 No. 2, 2003.13
In Canada, it is projected that by 2021, there will be almost 7 million people over
65 years of age making up 19% of the total population and that by 2041, seniors
will represent an estimated 25% of the population, up from 12.6% in 2001. By
the year 2000, the then-current middle-aged cohorts representing the baby boom
generation born between 1947 and 1966 made up nearly 33% of the Canadian
population. As the baby boom generation begins to reach age 65 by 2012, we
will experience a marked acceleration in the number and proportion of seniors.
And although all countries are not aging at the same pace, 2000 demographic
trends of other developed countries reveal changing age distribution resulting
also from declines in fertility rates and increased average longevity. As such,
we would concede that the real challenge does not relate solely to the number
of older persons, but also to the proportions of older persons to younger ones. 
In the context of this framework, a number of concerns have emerged.
Ranging from doubts associated with increasing demand on a health care
system that is already somewhat compromised, declining economic capacity
and growth resulting from an older and shrinking workforce and increased
social responsibility to the sustainability of our public pension system, it is
undoubtedly time to revisit the conventional wisdoms upon which the attitudes
and expectations of our nation are shaped. 
Accepting that the elderly population will continue to grow and that the
aging process itself plays a part in health deterioration, it is reasonable to
expect accentuated demand for health care resources. Based on Canadian
Institute for Health Information (CIHI) data, Canada’s 2003 total health care
expenditure reached an estimated $121 billion, which amounts to almost
$4,000 per person. The Conference Board of Canada estimates that total
health spending will increase to $147 billion in 2020, within which public
funding will increase to $102.5 billion. Having spent an estimated 10% of its
2001 gross domestic product (GDP) on health care, Canada’s total health
expenditure as a function of GDP is ranked 4th in the world. Given the expected
upward pressure resulting from the effects of the cost drivers (population
growth, aging, demand, increased prevalence of chronic diseases and inflation)
and the cost escalators (pharmaceuticals, home care, new technologies and
human resources in the health sector) health care costs will continue to attract
significant attention. With advances in best practices and learning from the
experiences of other countries more advanced than Canada in the aging
continuum which have meaningfully managed costs, Canada would be well
served to investigate potential restructuring of health care delivery financing,
health system reforms meeting the needs of seniors, policies that focus on
quality of life and more responsive cost/benefit models. 
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The shift in age structure of the population in Canada also influences our
workforce and corresponding labour supply patterns. Compounding the effects
of the baby boomer cohort nearing retirement age and a limited replacement
capacity is the finding that retirement before attainment of 65 years of age has
become more pervasive. In fact, current trends indicate that two-thirds of
Canadians retire before the full Canada Pension Plan/Quebec Pension Plan
benefit age of 65. The education and health care sectors are particularly at risk
of losing a large share of their workforce due to relatively young retirement
ages which are rendered more alluring by generous retirement incentives. Other
sectors experiencing shortages of skilled workers include skilled construction
trades-people, medical technologists and technicians, aircraft mechanics and
police officers. Although the inherent age configuration of respective vocations
will play a part, we emphasize that skill shortages arise also from other key
factors, or frictions, such as length of time or resources required to train, discerning
standards, geographic mobility of workers and inherent working conditions that
render it difficult to attract or retain workers. Depending on the relative success
of corrective adjustments, a number of complementing measures can serve to
calm some of the current and anticipated unrest. Emerging in the form of both
generic and vocation-specific policies, strategies which encourage increased
reproduction rates, immigration, labour force participation within select
groupings, mentoring behaviour, graduated redeployment strategies and extended
work life can be concurrently pursued. Advances in technology and market
globalization are transforming industrialized countries from resource-based
economies to knowledge-driven economies. Underscoring how human capital is
becoming an increasingly important engine of growth, it has the potential also
to enlarge the effective labour force and to slow the pace of anticipated erosion
or shrinking of the wage-income tax base.
Occasionally understated in the context of population aging is the potential
divisiveness that may be produced between generations. Granted, the working-age
population may be increasingly called upon to support, financially and otherwise,
a growing proportion of the population having reduced individual output and
requiring supplemental care and support. Importantly, though, the younger
generations will benefit also from the significant wealth of those seniors in the
form of commerce, taxation streams and inheritance. While no attempt has been
made in this paper to conduct experimental research into the collective revenue
repercussions, there is nevertheless cognitive recognition that aforementioned
pressures will be mitigated, at least to some extent, by current social regimes
and wealth exchanges that will naturally transpire over time. Admittedly, there
may be some timing discrepancies between the time at which the costs will be
incurred and the times at which government/societal windfalls might accrue,
but to ignore the causal relationship would be short-sighted. Our attitudes
towards the reconciliation of these timing differences and towards our own
personal or collective spending behaviours will in large part dictate the level
of success with which we will navigate the upcoming decades. Optimistically,
 the current landscape affords us ample opportunity to pursue and confer onto
future generations the legacy of our choosing. 
In the pursuit of policy towards these affirmative ends, we are compelled
to rally for balanced policy which provides a minimum standard of living to
all while meaningfully allowing Canadians to assume fuller responsibility
for, and greater independence in, their lives. Planning is a mutual undertaking
wherein government, communities and the individual assume responsibility
for different and complementing elements of the whole. Adopting a holistic
view, CGA-Canada would advocate for increased personal responsibility in
accurately articulating the average Canadian’s financial plan. Seen as good deals
for Canadians relative to individual contribution, government-administered
benefits such as the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), Old Age Security (OAS),
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS),War Veterans Allowance, Employment
Insurance (EI) and provincial or municipal income assistance (welfare) can
be accompanied by private plans such as registered pension plans (RPPs),
registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs) and non-registered savings vehicles.
On an absolute basis, the argument that social benefits alone cannot sustain the
holistic needs of an individual is relatively accurate. Importantly, though, we
must accept that these public programs are intended to provide for a minimum
standard of living to all Canadians and do not profess to meet more generous
levels of comfort. The answer therefore lies in effectively harmonizing personal
or private plans with the provisions of public programs.
Within a framework of increased awareness and understanding, social
accountability, goodwill and personal responsibility, stakeholders are better
equipped to responsively shape policy aimed at preserving the interdependent
interests of all Canadians.
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In the following pages, focus is directed to providing insight into the compo-
sition of Canada’s aging population and the journey by which we have come
to experience this aging trend. Relying on population statistics, a number of
standard indices used to measure population aging are presented while trends
in Canadian demography over the last five decades are likewise identified. Since
population aging is not unique to Canadian society but rather an observable
fact across the world, the Canadian experience is also considered within the
broader global context. 
What is Population Aging and How is it Measured?
Population aging occurs when a society’s age structure evolves in such a way
that future populations will have a higher proportion of their population in older
age groups than they currently do. From a demographic perspective, population
aging can be conceptualized and measured in a number of different ways.
Examination of Canada’s elderly population constituency, age dependency ratios,
the median age and population age distribution can give us a reasonably good
sense of our demographic portrait and how it is likely to evolve in the future.
Complemented by investigation of associated factors such as fertility rates, life
expectancy and immigration having the greatest impacts on demography, we can
better understand trends and begin to predict what we can expect in future years.
Methodology and Limitations
The data used in developing this report was, in large part, drawn from Statistics
Canada sources. Where possible, sources were selected based on their ability to
depict well the composition of the Canadian population while simultaneously
supporting international comparison. In the spirit of restricting our discussion
to national debate, and in the interest of brevity, national data only has been
aggregated without regard for provincial and territorial distinction. In studying
the data, the reader is therefore alerted that there may well be variations across
the regions of the country. Importantly also, it is to be noted that unless otherwise
stated, dollar references are expressed in Canadian currency. 
Other primary data sources include the Canadian Institute for Health
Information (CIHI), the United Nations population database, the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International
Labour Organization. In most cases, an examination of trends, indicators and
projections are presented. Where possible, the longest-range trajectory having
an outer limit of up to the year 2050 has been relied upon. Considering the
The Measures of Aging 2
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difficulty in predicting even five years into the future, let alone 50, it is
imperative to recognize the inherent uncertainties in taking such a long-term
approach. Notwithstanding, we are compelled to adopt some assumptions that
allow us to predict well into the future with the caveat that there can be significant
variation in outcomes when alterations to underlying assumptions are made.
Presented population projections are therefore based on the medium variant
for fertility, mortality and migration on the grounds of fairness and objective
dependability. It is also advisable to contemplate the potential for unforeseeable
circumstances to influence the size and scope of population changes and of social
and economic impacts. This is the nature of the exercise, and just as the baby
boom and drops in fertility of the 1960s had not been predicted, we likewise are
at risk of overlooking an unpredictable event or condition having the potential
to impact forecasted demographics or consequential effects. 
Our venture has not been to challenge the legitimacy of current data, but
rather to draw some reasonable observations from it. 
Key Findings Based on Demographic Analysis
In the following pages, measures of aging are explored as are the predictive
components and reflections upon which our conclusions and guiding comments
are predicated. Relying on that more rigorous analysis, we would commence our
discussion by inventorying the more salient findings stemming from the work.
In so doing, statements of fact can be focused and more readily accessible in a
concentrated form. While we invite, in fact encourage, review of the supporting
data, our extracted findings comprise of the following:
•  The 2001 Census of Canada revealed that almost 3.9 million or 12.6% of the
population in Canada was age 65 and over, up 63% from 2.4 million in 1981.
Projections also indicate that by 2021, there will be almost 7 million people
over 65 years of age, who will make up 19% of the total population and that
by 2041, seniors will represent an estimated 25% of the population.
•  The age dependency ratios in Canada between 1950 and 2050 reveal a
growing imbalance between the population of working people and those at
least in part dependent; that is, children and/or the elderly. Some time after
2010, it is predicted that the number of children and the number of elderly as
a percentage of the population will be equal and thereafter the elderly will
make up a greater percentage of the total population as compared to children.
•  The 2001 Census for Canada shows that the median age has reached
37.6 years, as compared to the previous 1996 census when it was 35.3. The
median age is expected to continue to increase, reaching 44.8 by the year
2030 and 45.8 by 2050. 
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•  Canada is experiencing population aging, not only because the older
population is growing relative to the total population, but because of a
decline in the younger population relative to the middle-aged (45 – 64)
population. The 2001 Census counted 1.7 million children age four and
under, down 11% from 1991.
•  By 2000, the middle-aged cohorts, who represent the baby boom generation
born between 1947 and 1966,made up nearly 33% of the Canadian population.
•  The baby boom generation will begin to reach age 65 by 2012 and this will
mark sharp acceleration of the aging population. In the 1950s, there were
some 20 seniors for every 100 young people; today there are closer to 50 and
by 2050, it is projected to reach about 125 elderly for every 100 young people.
•  The most rapid growth is occurring in the oldest-old (80-plus or 85-plus).
Between 1991 and 2001, the 80-plus population increased by 40.91% and
projections for 2001 to 2011 show an additional increase of 43.01%, for an
estimated 1.33 million people 80 years and over. In 1950, the proportion of
the population over 80 years old to the total population over 65 was about
14%. But by 2000, it had grown to 24% percent of the older population. It
is projected that by 2050 the oldest-old (80-plus) will make up about 37%
of the elderly.
•  Population aging is most rapid among women due to lower gender mortality
rates. In 2000, there were about 2.2 million older women (65-plus) and
1.7 million older men (65-plus), or a gender ratio of 129 women for every
100 men. By the year 2000, the female-to-male ratio for persons 85 and over
reached 229 females for every 100 males.
•  Birth rates reached a high of 3.9 children per woman in the period from
1955 to 1960. Subsequent decades witnessed a reversal and steep decline in
birth rates. The fertility rate needed to maintain a stationary population is
2.1, a rate that Canada has not experienced since the early 1970s.
•  Average life expectancy in Canada has been increasing continuously, rising
by 10 years from 69 years of age in 1950 to 79 in 2000. Females continue
to have a higher life expectancy than males. Longevity for both sexes is
expected to continue to rise in the 21st century.
•  Average life expectancy of Canada’s seniors has been rising over the last
century. A 65-year-old in 2001 had an estimated remaining life expectancy
of 19.0 years, up one year from 1991.
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•  The effect of immigration on age structure has generally been to contribute
to its youthfulness, although its impact on population aging in Canada has
been limited.
•  Canada currently represents 0.5% of the world’s population and, according to
United Nations projections, will represent only 0.4% of that total population
by 2050.
•  Demographic patterns experienced world-wide over time tend to reflect a
gradual transition from high fertility and high mortality rates to low fertility
and delayed mortality. In 2000, the age distribution of developed countries
(North America, Japan, Europe,Australia and New Zealand) showed similar
proportions of younger and older persons. A similar pattern emerges for
developing countries later in the century.
•  The causes of global aging arise from the same factors identified for Canada:
declines in fertility and increases in life expectancy. For most developed
countries, fertility rates have dropped below renewal levels of 2.1 children
per woman to a range of 1.6 to 1.8. In the past 50 years, global life expectancy
at birth has risen from around age 45 to age 65. In the developed world, life
expectancy has risen to age 75. Japan is the world’s longevity leader, where
life expectancy is now over 80 years of age.
•  Not all countries are aging at the same rate. In some European countries,
the fertility decline was earlier than in North America and their populations
are older than Canada’s. Countries with low fertility rates, such as Italy, Spain,
Germany and Japan, are starting to witness shrinking of their populations.
In countries such as China and some of the Eastern European (former
Soviet block) countries, fertility patterns and age structures are beginning to
resemble those of developed countries. In the United States, where fertility
rates are closer to renewal levels and immigration rates are the highest in
the developed world, the population is aging somewhat less rapidly than
other developed nations.
•  The proportion of the population over 65 years of age in Canada is still
relatively small compared with other G8 nations. However, while the seniors
in Canada today represent a similar percentage compared to the United States
(i.e. 12.6% vs. 12.3%), by 2050, seniors are projected to make up 25.7% of
the Canadian population compared to 20% in the U.S. 
Percentage Representation of the Elderly Population 
Population aging is often measured by changes in the percentage of the
population that is considered old. Since one of the intrinsic concerns in the
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study of population aging is the anticipated stress on the retirement system,
the traditional age of retirement is the proxy most often used. The impact of
an aging population on the retirement system is discussed in the ‘Social and
Private Income Security Programs’ section of this paper. Adopting age 65 
as a typical cut-off point, a population is said to be aging when the percentage
of its population aged 65 and over is increasing.
2
The dramatic rise in the age 65 and over population, in terms of actual
numbers and as a percentage of the total population since the 1920s in Canada,
is illustrated below.
The 2001 Census of Canada revealed that almost 3.9 million, or 12.6% of
the population in Canada, was age 65 and over, up 63% from 2.4 million in
1981. In 1921, only 5% of the population in Canada was constituted by
seniors. Today, more than one in eight Canadians is a senior. This trend is
2  It should be noted that lower cut-off points are also used, e.g., “World Population Aging,” Population
Division, DESA, United Nations presents its data on population aging using age 60 and over. The 55 and
over age range is also sometimes referred to as “senior citizens.”
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expected to continue well into the 21st century. Statistics Canada has projected
that by 2021, there will be almost 7 million people over 65 years of age, who
will make up 19% of the total population and that by 2041, there will be over
9 million seniors comprising an estimated 25% of the population.
Age Dependency Ratios
A related measure of aging is the elderly dependency ratio, the number of
individuals of retirement age (age 65-plus)
3 compared to the number of those
of working age (age 15 – 64).
4 The age dependency ratios illustrated in Figure 2
show the aging population trend in Canada and the resulting growing imbalance
between the population of working people and those who are dependent; that
is, children and/or the elderly by definition.
It is helpful to look at all three dependency ratios to understand the degree
of economic burden in the future. The figure below illustrates that the decline
in the percentage of children has exceeded the growth in the percentage of the
elderly. Some time after 2010, it is predicted that the number of children and
the number of elderly as a percentage of the working population will be equal and
thereafter, the elderly will make up a greater percentage of the total population
as compared to children.
3  For convenience, the elderly dependent population is taken as those 65-plus. This would not take into account
those who retire before age 65 or those age 65-plus who continue to work and/or care for themselves. 
4  Working age is assumed to start at age 15. However, in reality many individuals continue their education
beyond that age and remain financially dependent.
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Median Age
Another widely used indicator for population aging is the median age, the age
at which exactly half the population is older and the other half is younger.
Canada’s median age has been increasing steadily since 1966, the end of the
baby boom, when it was 25.4 years. The 2001 Census for Canada shows that the
median age has reached 37.6 years, compared with the previous census in 1996
when it was 35.3. This increase of 2.3 years, the largest census-to-census
increase in a century, was due primarily to the decline in the number of births
since 1991. The median age is expected to continue to increase, reaching 44.8
by the year 2030 and 45.8 by 2050 (Figure 3).
Population Age Distribution
Population aging is a dynamic process that occurs over time and involves changes
in the entire population age distribution, not only the age 65 and over group. 
Table 1, Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that Canada is experiencing popula-
tion aging not only because the older population is growing relative to the total
population but also because of a decline in the younger population relative to
the middle-aged population. The 2001 Census counted 1.7 million children age
four and under, down 11% from 1991, due primarily to falling fertility rates.
By 2011, this group may decline further to 1.6 million.
The overall changes in the age structure of a population over time are often
depicted as population pyramids. The shape of the pyramid and the size of the
various age segments contain much information that cannot be described by a
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single number. Youthful populations are represented by the classic pyramid shape
with a broad base of young children and a narrow apex of older people, while
older populations resemble more a pillar shape with more uniform numbers of
people in age categories. Age distributions can be irregular taking into account
various past events (e.g., wars, economic depression).
Figure 6 shows the changes over time in the percentages of Canada’s total
population by five year age groups for males and females. In 1950, Canada’s
population was typical of a more youthful population, where each successively
younger age cohort represents a larger proportion of the population. The slight
indentation for several younger age cohorts was due to drops in fertility rates
during the Depression and World War II. The decline in fertility and increases
in longevity are serving to turn the traditional population pyramid on its head.
By 2000, the shape of Canada’s population structure had changed to more
closely resemble a cylinder due to a more even distribution in each age group.
The bulge in the middle-aged cohorts represents the baby boom generation
born between 1947 and 1966. This largest cohort makes up nearly 33% of the
Canadian population. 
Declining fertility rates in the 1960s resulted in a relatively small baby bust
cohort, born between 1966 and 1979. These baby busters, sometimes referred
to as Generation X, currently account for 18% of the population. The children
of the baby boom generation produced the relatively large baby boom echo
cohort, also known as Generation Y, born between 1980 and 1995. In spite of
the continuing low fertility rates, the large numbers of boomers are such that
the echo boom now makes up 21% of the total population. Finally, children
born after the echo generation, starting from 1996, are known as the millennium
busters and currently comprise only 8% of the population.
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Over the coming decades, it is expected that the population structure will
continue to square up as a result of low fertility rates and increases in longevity.
The baby boom generation will begin to reach age 65 by 2012 and this will mark
the acceleration of the aging population. By 2050, the population pyramid will
resemble a cylinder with a top on it due to the large proportion over 65 years of
age compared to those who are under 20 years of age. In the 1950s, there were
some 20 seniors for every 100 young people; today there are closer to 50 and
by 2050, it is projected to reach about 125 elderly for every 100 young people.
In order to better reflect the changing age structure within the older
population, the 65 and over age group can be further divided into subcategories.
These subcategories are often referred to as the young-old, the middle-old,
and the old-old. The partial age pyramids for the population age 65 and over
(see Figure 7) show the trends in aging for these subcategories. Two notable
features are:
• The deepening of population aging. 
The most rapid growth is occurring in the oldest-old (80-plus or 85-plus).
Between 1991 and 2001, the 80-plus population increased by 40.91% to
932,000. Projections for 2001 to 2011 show an additional increase of 43.01%,
reaching an estimated 1.3 million people 80 years and over. 
In 1950, the proportion of the population over 80 years old to the total
population over 65 was about 14%. But by 2000, it had grown to 24% of
the older population. It is projected that by 2050, the old-old (80-plus) will
make up about 37% of the elderly.
•  The “feminization” of population aging. 
Population aging is most accentuated among women due to lower mortality
rates. In 2000, there were about 2.2 million older women (65-plus) and
1.7 million older men (65-plus), or a gender ratio of 129 women for every
100 men. The female-to-male ratio increases with age reaching 229 females
for every 100 males for persons aged 85 and over by 2000. 
Historically, senior female-to-male ratios have shifted over time. Prior to
1950, senior men outnumbered senior women mainly because of maternal
mortality. But by 1950, the ratio of senior men to women was almost
one-to-one and has steadily declined during the 1990s. This trend has now





The higher proportions of the future population in the older age groups as
illustrated in the population pyramids presented in Figure 6 clearly show that
the Canadian population is aging. The main cause of this aging is the long-term
historical decline in the fertility rates of the population. A dropping birth rate
simply equates to fewer children, and by association, the older population
resultantly represents a larger share of the total. 
Birth rates soared in the 1950s, reaching a high of 3.9 children per woman
in the period from 1955 to 1960. Subsequent decades witnessed a reversal of
this trend and steep decline in rates (see Figure 8). The fertility rate needed to
maintain a stationary population is 2.1 children per woman, a rate that Canada
has not experienced since the early 1970s. The United Nations classifies those
countries having a total average fertility at or below 2.1 children per woman in
1995 – 2000 as low fertility. Canada is therefore considered as a low fertility
country with a fertility rate of 1.56 for 1995 – 2000. Medium variant UN
projections assume that fertility rates will slowly climb up edging closer to
replacement levels by 2050.
5
The Factors Affecting 
Population Aging 3
5  It is important to recognize that fertility rates are highly variable, difficult to explain and hard to predict.
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Life Expectancy
The rise in average life expectancy or longevity, coupled with the decline in
birth rates, will affect both the number and proportion of the elderly population.
As depicted in Figure 9, average life expectancy at birth in Canada has been
increasing continuously, rising 10 years between 1950 and 2000, from 69 years
of age to 79. That is, the average life expectancy of an individual born between
1950 and 1955 is 69.1 years, whereas the average life expectancy of an individual
born between 2000 and 2005 is 79.3 years. As the figure illustrates, females
have a higher life expectancy compared to males, while longevity for both is
expected to continue to rise in the 21st century.
Gains in average life expectancy to a large extent have been made at the
younger ages, primarily from reductions in infant mortality. Improvements
have also been made in survival probability at the older ages, although some
believe that future gains will be less as further reductions in premature mortality
are likely to be small. There are few people who live to 110 years of age,
although the 2001 Census enumerated 3,795 Canadians aged 100 years and
over, an increase of 21% from 1996 when there were 3,125. Of these 3,795
centenarians, 3,055 were women and 740 were men.
As medical research and trials continue into the treatment and cure of
disease and into halting or reversing of aging, progress can be expected in
extending human lives and in improving health and quality of life of elderly
people. Newspaper headlines announcing discoveries, like “‘Superfly’ may
hold the key to long life — Life-prolonging drugs closer to reality”
6 are taking
us out of the realm of science fiction and closer to practical application. And,
although there may be a practical limit, some speculate that life spans could
reach 110 and 120 years of age and even beyond.
7 The prospect of a growing
number of people of very advanced age has considerable implication for
budgets, economies and financial markets in aging nations. While these
predictions may seem far-fetched, it is interesting to note that 20 years ago
it was commonly accepted in actuarial circles that life spans peaked at the
age of 80 or so.
8
6  “Superfly may hold the key to long life — Life-prolonging drugs closer to reality.” The Ottawa Citizen. 
August 10, 2004.
7 Robert Stowe England, The Fiscal Challenge of an Aging Industrial World, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Significant Issue Series, Volume 24, Number 1, 2002, see Chapter 7 “Science’s
Quest for Longer, Healthier Lives,” pp. 85 –100.
8  See note 7, Chapter 6 “Is there a Maximum Life Span,” p. 78.
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Average life expectancy of Canada’s seniors has been rising over the last
century. As illustrated in Figure 10, a 65-year-old in 2001 had an estimated
remaining life expectancy of 19.0 years, whereas it was 18.0 years in 1991.
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Although the gap is narrowing, life expectancy at age 65 continues to be
greater for females than for males (Table 2). As the table illustrates, women
can expect to enjoy a net life expectancy after age 65 of 20.6 years compared
to 17.1 years for men in 2001. Nevertheless, male life expectancy after age 65
has increased by 0.3 of a year between 2000 and 2001, while female life
expectancy has only grown 0.2 of a year during the same period.
While rates of average life expectancy at birth have increased, it is interesting
to consider the extent to which “healthy” life expectancy has kept pace.
Disability-free life expectancy distinguishes between the years free of any
activity limitation and years experienced with at least one activity limitation.
Years of life lived above the threshold are counted in full, while those below
are not. Table 3, which follows, compares life expectancy with disability-free
life expectancy for males and females in Canada in 1996. Notably, there is a
difference of almost 10 years between life expectancy at birth and disability-free
life expectancy. It is interesting to note that although women live almost 5.8 years
longer than their men counterparts, only 3.3 of those years are disability-free.
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Immigration
Immigration has played a significant role in the population dynamics of
Canada. The effect of immigration on age structure has generally been to
contribute to its youthfulness, although its impact on population aging in
Canada has been limited. Predicting immigration rates is, at best, difficult
and dependent to a large extent on government policy as well as shifting social
and economic pressures. Citizenship and Immigration Canada has set the goal
for annual immigration at a level of 1.0% of the total population. In 2002,
immigration activity stood at 229,054, considerably below the target of just
over 300,000. In addition to increasing its quotas, as may be evidenced by way
of Figure 11, Canada has put in place selection criteria with respect to job
skills, education and investment capacity. The Conference Board of Canada
projects a slow increase in immigration numbers from about 230,000 per year
to 270,000 by 2025.
  34
 35
How does demographic change in Canada compare to the rest of the world?
Canada currently represents 0.5% of the world’s population and, according to
United Nations projections, will represent only 0.4% of that population by
2050. Given the global village that we live in, it is important to look at the
Canadian experience in the broadest context.
Demographic patterns experienced world-wide over time tend to reflect a
gradual transition from high fertility and high mortality rates to low fertility and
delayed mortality. The transition is marked initially by a decline in infant and
childhood mortality, which can be attributed to a large extent to improvements in
public health and sanitation. Lower childhood mortality leads to longer average
life expectancy and an otherwise younger population. Declining reproduction
rates and improvements in adult health result in an older population. The
population pyramids presented in Figure 12 show global age distribution
changes. In 2000, the age distribution of developed countries (North America,
Japan, Europe,Australia and New Zealand) show similar proportions of younger
and older persons. A similar pattern emerges for developing countries later in
the century.
The causes of global aging arise from the same factors earlier identified for
Canada: declines in fertility and increases in life expectancy. Reproduction
rates have declined in developing countries during the past 30 years and in
developed countries throughout the 20th century. For most developed countries,
fertility rates have dropped below replacement levels of 2.1 children per woman
to a range of 1.6 to 1.8. In the past 50 years, global average life expectancy at
birth has risen from around age 45 to age 65. In Canada, average life expectancy
has risen to age 79.3. Japan is the world’s longevity leader, where average life
expectancy is now over 80 years of age.
9
However, not all countries are aging at the same rate. The population
pyramids earlier presented for Canada show a squaring up over the next
decades with declining fertility and increasing longevity, offset to some extent
by immigration rates. In some European countries, the fertility decline was
earlier than in North America and their populations are older than that of
Canada. For these developed countries, we will see an evolving inversion of the
classic pyramidal age structure. Countries with low fertility rates, such as Italy,
Spain, Germany and Japan, are starting to witness shrinking in their population
numbers. In countries such as China and some of the Eastern European (former
Soviet block) countries, fertility patterns and age structures are beginning to
resemble those of more highly-developed countries. In the United States,
Global Aging 4
9  Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations
Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001
Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp, August 30, 2004.
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where fertility rates are close to replacement levels and immigration rates are
the highest in the developed world, the population is aging somewhat less
rapidly than other developed nations.
The size of the senior population in Canada compared to other G8 nations
is shown in Figure 13. The proportion of the population over 65 years of age
in Canada is still relatively small when compared with other industrialized
countries. This situation will, however, change in the next decades due to the
impact of aging of Canada’s baby boomers and the pace of decline in the
fertility rates at the end of the 1960s. And while the seniors in Canada today
represent a similar percentage as that of the United States, by 2050, seniors are
projected to make up 25.7% of the population compared to 20% in the U.S.
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The aging population trend in Canada began its steep climb around the 1970s,
and it is estimated that in the year 2000, we were considered to be less than
half way through this trend as the proportion of older people is expected to
increase for yet another 30 years or more. Seeing that it is unlikely that a sudden
or dramatic increase in reproduction rates will occur and given our collective
desire and continuous efforts in prolonging life expectancy, the aging trend
will undoubtedly continue along its trajectory. Given that the same phenomenon
is producing itself all around the world, the prospect that an influx of younger
people through immigration can have a significant impact on our demographic
landscape is relatively nominal. 
The baby boomers, who represent our largest age cohort, will begin to reach
retirement age (based on today’s benchmark of age 65) by 2012, characteristically
marking the acceleration of the aging population. They, especially the women
amongst them, are expected to live longer than seniors from previous generations.
Of significant interest to all Canadians is how the progression of this aging
trend and our behaviour towards it will influence our individual and collective
futures. The last decade can be characterized as one in which we have experienced
a heightened level of unease and one in which the subject has captured the
attention of multiple audiences. A number of fears have surfaced:
•  Fear that having more older people, often needing greater health care
services, will create a substantial and unsustainable demand for costly
medical and health care services;
•  Concern that cumulative economic and social responsibilities, including
support for older people, will fall upon other cross-sections of the population; 
•  Fear that mass exits/retirements from the workforce will create a shortage
of skills which, combined with an older workforce, may hinder current
efforts to increase economic output and productivity in Canada;
•  Fear that escalating costs of providing public pensions to a growing number
of older people will place an intolerable burden on people of working age;
•  Fear that shifting more resources towards older people will exacerbate
intergenerational inequities, thus creating new divisions between generations;
and
A Closing Word on Demographics 5
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•  Fear that our current universal pension system (CPP/QPP) is in jeopardy
and may not be sustainable in the future.
Indeed, when we look at demographic projections, all of these scenarios
and their potentially disastrous outcomes seem possible. Does this mean that
the forces of demography will determine our destiny? Not likely, because
society does not evolve in a systemic linear fashion as demography might
suggest. At the risk of being overly simplistic, we cannot predict the future or
respond to it based on population projections alone. As many researchers suggest,
the outcomes of population aging in the future will not be determined only by
the proportion of the population in older age groups but also by how those
people themselves will behave or react and how they might do so compared to
that which they might have earlier imagined. Case in point: recently in
Maclean’s magazine,Allan Gregg reminded us of Mick Jagger’s statement that
he’d rather be dead than singing Satisfaction at the age of 45! 
Guess what? He was on tour doing exactly that on his 60th birthday. As
we seem to be redefining what is old, we realize that demography does not
necessarily tell the whole story. 
Because the aging population trend is one felt throughout the world, some
demographers consider that the impacts of this demographic revolution in our
global society may parallel the magnitude of that of the Industrial Revolution,
which was considered to be the most significant socio-economic event in history.
Like any significant change, it will attract challenges as well as opportunities.
Our ability to deal with this remarkable demographic change in a positive way
will depend on our ability to harness those opportunities to counteract challenges.
And in order to adequately outfit ourselves with the appropriate attitudes,
interpretations and policies we must start to anticipate what they might be.
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Clearly, it is well established that we live in an aging world. While this has
been recognized for quite some time in a number of developed countries, it
is only during the last decade or so that this phenomenon has been fully
acknowledged. Like many trends experienced in the past, this one will
undoubtedly have a very long-term affect, will involve a large segment of the
population and will impact future generations. The potential to reverse the
trend is extremely low while the magnitude of its effects is considerable,
touching practically every aspect of life and permeating all social, economic and
cultural spheres. It is, therefore, not surprising that in recent years, population
aging has attracted the attention of many policy researchers, analysts and
economists who are attempting to predict the many social and economic
impacts of this trend in an endeavour to help decision-makers better prepare
for the future.
In the previous section, we spoke about the fears and concerns Canadians
have over the social and economic impacts that population aging may have on
their futures. So far, these concerns have focused on particular issues related
to aging: increasing demand on a health care system that is already somewhat
compromised, declining economic capacity and growth resulting from an older
and shrinking workforce, increased social responsibilities for the sandwich
generation (those providing some level of care to both children and parents)
and uncertainty around the future viability of our public pension systems. So
what does an aging population really mean and what significance does it have
for Canadians in the future? The following sections take an in-depth look at
these major social and economic conditions. Having the goal of imparting a
focused understanding of the most salient issues, we will address:
• Health system pressures;
• Labour supply concerns;
• Intergenerational relationships; and
• Social and private income security programs.
For each of these issues, details of the current situation and what researchers
say we can expect in the future based on trends will be examined. As one might
suspect of such a diverse subject, all researchers are not of the same mind on what
these trends may represent in the future. Having no crystal ball, we are collectively
unable to predict the future with indisputable certainty and as such will devote
some time to the discussion of potential scenarios. The number of challenges
and opportunities we can identify largely depends on whether population aging
is approached in a negative or positive way. Both perspectives are considered.  
Preamble to Social and 
Economic Considerations 6
   42
 43
Accepting that the elderly population will continue to grow and that the aging
process itself contributes to health deterioration, it is reasonable to concede
that people within that age group will be the greatest consumers of health care
services. It stands to reason, therefore, that we can expect to have greater
demand for these types of services. Compounding that source of demand, the
aging trend also indicates a deepening of the aging population meaning that
the proportion of people aged 80 and over will increase relative to the overall
elderly population. Within the context of the current health care system, this
age group is viewed as the “frail” elderly. The prospect of a growing number
of people of very advanced age will have implications on health care budgets
as well as on the type of health care services and human capital required. So
what are the anticipated costs and how does the Canadian health care system
fair on the international front?
Key Findings Relating to the Health System Pressures
•  Based on Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) data, Canada’s
2003 total health care expenditure reached an estimated $121 billion, which
amounts to almost $4,000 per person. The private sector accounted for
approximately one-third of that total.
•  The Conference Board of Canada estimates that total health spending will
increase to $147 billion in 2020 from $80.7 billion in 2000. This translates
into an increase of approximately 83% of the real health care cost over the
20 years from 2000 to 2020.
•  In 2001, Canada spent an estimated 10% of its gross domestic product
(GDP) on health care as per CIHI.
•  When compared to other countries, Canada is ranked as one of the four
countries having the highest total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
• Canada is within the top third of countries with respect to the ratio of public
sector spending on health to total health expenditure compared to private
sector spending, where Canada is in the middle range.
•  Based on 2001 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) health data, at US$1,978 public sector funding per capita, Canada
falls within the top third of countries and at US$814 private sector spending
Health System Pressures 7
the proportion of people
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per capita, Canada is among the four countries having the highest health
expenditure per capita funded by the private sector. 
•  More than 50% of a person’s lifetime health care expenditures occur after
the age of 65. In 2001, seniors over 65 years of age comprised about 12.6%
of the population, yet they consumed more than 43% of government health
spending compared with infants, who accounted for 3% of total government
health expenditure.
•  A large share of total lifetime health care costs is incurred at the time of
death, mainly as a result of expensive medical and hospital costs. Another
large share of the total lifetime health care costs occurs in the last year or
two of life as a result of long-term care resulting from disability.
•  The OECD’s study on disability rates and long-term care reported that in
Canada, the number of elderly people living in institutions will increase
61% in the period from 2000 to 2020 as compared to 33% in the U.S. and
even lower increases in European countries. The number of disabled living
at home will increase 62% over the same time period. It is further expected
that long-term care spending will increase in Canada from 0.5% of GDP in
2000 to 0.8% in 2020.
•  The Canadian health care sector is already experiencing a shortage of
health care professionals as Canada’s health workforce is retiring earlier
and the average age is increasing from 39.1 years in 1994 to 40.8 years in
2000. This shortage seems more acute within the nursing profession. 
•  About 12% of older Canadians needing long-term care currently live in
some type of long-term care facility. An Ipsos-Reid poll released in July
2002 shows that nearly half (47%) of Canadians are concerned about
becoming a burden to someone when they get older. And, one in four is
concerned that they will need to care for their parents when they get older.
However, just 12% of Canadians currently have private long-term care
insurance.
•  Around 2010, some 60% of boomers over the age of 50 will have a surviving
parent, compared to 1960, when just 16% of over-50s had a surviving parent.
•  Statistics Canada projects that annual deaths will increase by 40% between
2002 and 2020. About 75% of deaths in Canada occur in a hospital setting
or long-term care facility, although research shows that 90% of Canadians
would prefer to spend their final days at home with the available home
support services.
47% of Canadians are 
concerned about becoming
a burden to someone
when they get older
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Rising Health Expenditures
Health care spending in Canada has followed a trend of relatively strong growth
in constant as well as current dollars since 1997, with total health expenditure
(public and private)
10 reaching an estimated $121 billion in 2003 (see Figure 14).
This amounts to almost $4,000 per person (see Figure 15) with the private sector
accounting for about 33% of the total. In 2001, Canada spent an estimated
10% of gross domestic product (GDP), a measure of economic output, on health
care, matching the all-time high reached in 1992 (see Figure 19). A period of
government fiscal restraint during the early and mid-1990s was followed by a
resumption of growth rates resulting from government reinvestment (see
Figure 17).
The Conference Board of Canada estimates that total health spending,
adjusted for inflation, will increase from $80.7 billion in 2000 to $147.0 billion
in 2020. In the same period, real provincial and territorial government funding
will increase from $55.9 billion to $102.5 billion. This translates into an almost
doubling (83%) of real health care costs over the 20 years spanning 2000 to 2020.
Health care spending outpaces by a ratio of 2:1 all public expenditures on other
goods and services, which are predicted to rise in the same period by 36.5%.
11
10 Public sector includes all health expenditures by governments and government agencies financed by
three levels of government; provincial and territorial governments; federal government direct health care
spending; municipal government; and by Workers’ Compensation Boards and other social security
schemes. Private sector expenditure includes household out-of-pocket, private health insurance and 
non-consumption (e.g., hospital non-patient revenue, capital expenditures for privately owned facilities
and health research).
11 The Conference Board of Canada, The Future Cost of Health Care in Canada, 2000 to 2020, p. 17.
total health spending will
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International Comparison of Health Expenditures
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
maintains a health database for 30 member countries using a standardized
reporting system which allows for fair comparison of data between countries.
The data for 2001 as presented in CIHI’s National Health Expenditures Trends
report is reflected in the figures presented in this section broken down by total,
public and private health spending. 
Although there are wide variations in health expenditure per capita between
some countries, the share of GDP shows less variation, in part because level
of health expenditure is determined by level of GDP.
12 So, how does Canada
compare to other countries?
•  We are among the four countries having the highest total health expenditure
as a percentage of GDP. 
•  Canada is within the top third of countries with respect to ratio of public
sector spending on health to total health expenditure compared to private
sector spending, where Canada is in the middle range.
•  At  US$1,978 public sector funding per capita in 2001, Canada falls within
the top third of countries.
12 The Conference Board of Canada’s report on The Future Cost of Health Care in Canada, 2000 to 2020
points out that there isn’t a one-to-one relationship between nominal economic growth and public revenue.
The report predicts that the overall share of government revenues relative to GDP will decline over the next
20 years, due in part to an aging population consuming less and saving more and thereby reducing the
government’s revenue. As a result, what appears to be manageable health care spending in the context of
overall GDP is less manageable when compared to overall public revenues.
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•  At US$814 private sector spending per capita in 2001, Canada is among
four countries having the highest health expenditure per capita funded by
the private sector.
The United States is clearly an outlier compared with other OECD countries,
including Canada. Given Canada’s proximity to the United States, there is
both an opportunity and a challenge inherent in these differences. As pointed
out in the report from the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada:
Exposure of Canadian scientists, researchers, patients and health care
providers to American medical and scientific innovations,American research
organizations and high-end health care facilities (such as the Mayo Clinic)
raise expectations of what can be done in Canada. While all OECD countries
face increasing health care costs, Canada’s pressures will always be more
intense because of our relationship with, and proximity to, the United States.
13
13 Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Final Report, p. 32.
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Health Care Expenditure and Aging Populations
The changing demographics of an aging population affect the health care
system by:
•  Increasing the future demand for health care resources — more than 50%
of a person’s lifetime health care expenditures occur after the age of 65;
•  Influencing the level and mix of services needed (e.g., home care, geriatric
programs, long term care and chronic care); and
•  Impacting on the supply side of health care — fewer people working means
lower tax revenues collected to pay for health care; as well, an aging labour
force and increasing retirement put further pressure on the supply of health
care workers.
Figures 26 and 27 portray total 2001 public health expenditure in Canada by
age and per capita as reported by The Canadian Institute for Health Information
(CIHI). Health care spending is significantly higher at either end of the age
spectrum. More than $6,000 per capita is spent on infants (less than 1 year of
age) and over $17,000 per capita for people over 85 years of age. Seniors over
65 years of age comprise about 12.6% of the population, yet they consume more
than 43% of government health spending compared with infants, who account
for 3% of total government health expenditure. The older the elderly, the more
more than 50% of a 
person’s lifetime health
care expenditures occur
after the age of 65
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health care services they consume. In Canada, the ratio of per capita health
spending on those age 85 and over to those aged 65 to 74 is 3.4:1.
Advances in medical technology, as well as increasing public expectations,
are likely to continue to exert upward pressure on health care spending for all
age groups. This trend will, however, be potentially explosive due to the increase
in the number of people over 65 years of age whose health care costs per capita
are about three to five times greater than those under 65. 
Two demographic features will drive health care costs up: having a higher
share of the population that are relatively old, and having a higher share in
their final years of life. The increase in per-capita health expenditure with age
is mainly the result of costs (medical and hospital) incurred at the time of
death. As might be expected, the large share of lifetime health care costs is
incurred in the last year or two of life. Costs associated with long-term health
care for the elderly population will also serve to escalate costs. Having studied
disability rates and long-term care predictions, the OECD has reported the
following for Canada:
•  The number of elderly people living in institutions will increase 61% in
Canada during the period from 2000 to 2020, compared with 33% in the
U.S. and lower growth rates in European countries.
•  The number of disabled living at home will increase 62% over the same
time period.
•  There will be a 48% increase in long-term care spending in Canada, from
0.5% of GDP in 2000 to 0.8% in 2020.
14
One in four Canadian seniors suffer from a long-term disability and many
have chronic health condition such as arthritis, rheumatism, high blood pressure,
chronic heart problems, diabetes, dementia etc. (see Table 3: Disability-free
Life Expectancy). Currently, an estimated 238,000 Canadians over 65 years of
age suffer from Alzheimer disease. It is estimated that more than 509,000
Canadians will be diagnosed with Alzheimer disease by the year 2031.
15
It is commonly accepted that projections of health care expenditures are
even more uncertain than those of pension expenditures as the demand for and
supply of health care does not have an equivalent framework by which to
reasonably estimate future benefits or liabilities. While aging populations’
health needs drive up the cost of health spending, other factors including
technology, public expectations, pharmaceuticals etc. also contribute to amplify
costs. The Conference Board of Canada report on Understanding Health Care
Cost Drivers and Escalators, March 2004, estimates that an additional public
investment of $5 billion annually is needed to cover the effects of the cost drivers
14 See note 7, OECD study referred to on pages 111 – 112.
15 Alzheimer Society of Canada.
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(population growth, aging, demand, increased prevalence of chronic diseases
and inflation). As well, the cost escalators (pharmaceuticals, home care, new
technologies and health human resources) need to be factored in. Further, the
Conference Board of Canada projects that the contribution of aging alone to the
growth in health care costs will be 0.8% each year on overall annual growth
of health care costs of 5.3% in nominal terms to 2020. With the baby boomers
reaching 65 years of age in 2012, the impact of the aging population on health
costs will be significant. An aging population will account for one-third of the
growth in estimated real health care expenditure growth. Hogan and Hogan
(2002) also estimate that aging alone will generate an increase of more than
30% in real per capita health expenditures by the year 2030.
16
Other developed countries like Canada are experiencing the impact of an
aging population on their health care systems. Some of these countries are
ahead of Canada in terms of aging of their populations and have been able to
meaningfully manage their costs. For example, in 2000, the percentage of the
elderly population in the United Kingdom, France and Japan was higher than
of Canada, yet their total health care spending as a percentage of GDP and on
a per capita basis was less than that of Canada (see Figure 13). According to
one study, international evidence suggests that modest growth in economies
will enable most countries to manage the growth in their aging populations
and increased health spending patterns.
17
An Aging Health Care Workforce
The health care sector is already experiencing a shortage of health care
professionals and this is predicted to worsen over the coming years with the
pending retirement of the baby boomer cohort. The following statistics reported
by CIHI describe the situation:
18
•  In 2000, the health care and social services sector employed about one in
10 employed Canadians.
•  Canada’s health care workforce is retiring earlier and the average age of the
workforce is increasing from 39.1 years in 1994 to 40.8 years in 2000.
•  Part-time work is more common in the health sector than in other areas.
52% of health care workers are employed full-time compared to 74% for
other workers.
16 Seamus Hogan and Sarah Hogan. How Will the Aging of the Population Affect Health Care Needs and
Costs in the Foreseeable Future? Discussion Paper No. 25. Commission on the Future of Health Care in
Canada. October 2002.
17 Rosenberg, M. Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population. SEDAP Research Paper No. 14,
2000.
18 Canada’s Health Care Providers, CIHI, November 2001.
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19 O’Brien-Pallas, L., Alksnis, C. and Want, S. Bringing the Future into Focus: Projecting RN Retirement in
Canada. CIHI, 2003.
20 Cited in the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002, pp. 183 – 184.
•  People who work in health care are one-and-one-half times more likely to miss
work because of illness and disability than workers in other sectors. In 2000,
7.2% were absent for health reasons compared to 4.8% for all other workers.
A recent CIHI study on nursing retirement in Canada highlights the particular
urgency of the workforce shortage. Nursing is an older profession, and as such
employs people across the adult age spectrum. With about 47% of practicing
registered nurses (RNs) being over 45 in 2001, as compared to 35% to the rest
of the labour force, the profession is acutely aware of its likely inability to
respond to increasing demands. Distressing as it might be, nearly one-third of
practicing RNs in Canada are 50 years of age or older. Increasingly, a larger
proportion of nurses are retiring early, many by age 56. The number of RNs
employed in nursing increased by only 1.1% between 1997 and 2001. This
rate of growth, which is less than that of the population, unsurprisingly results
in fewer RNs per person in Canada in 2001 than in 1997. According to the
study, these numbers and ratios are projected to continue to deteriorate with
the loss of 29,746 RNs age 50 or older (through retirement or death) by the
year 2006, an equivalent of 13% of the total 2001 nursing workforce.
19
Long-term Care and Family Supports
As we embark upon this discussion, it is acknowledged that many seniors live
healthy, independent lives and require only occasional care from health services.
However, when older people become frail and have multiple or complex health
problems, these people need supplemental support, formal and/or informal, in
order to facilitate daily living activities. This long-term care component of health
care poses a growing challenge to existing public, family and personal resources.
Formal support essentially consists of two forms:
•  Community-based care which permits an older person to remain at home
while receiving home care services or other community-based health and
social services (e.g., meals on wheels, day programs etc.).
•  Institutional-based care, either in private residences or spaces in government
subsidized long-term care facilities, which require a co-payment.
Informal support is usually provided by family members but can likewise be
provided by friends and neighbours. Most of the informal support received by
an elderly person is provided by other elderly persons, in particular spouses.
There are upwards of three million informal caregivers in Canada providing
up to 90% of the care needs of Canada’s elderly.
20 The projected growth in the
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elderly dependency ratio (see Figure 2) and the decline in the number of working
taxpayers relative to the number of older people may result in inadequate public
resources and fewer young people to care for those who are aging. 
About 12% of older Canadians needing long-term care currently live in
some type of long-term care facility, which can easily cost in excess of $3,000
per month. An Ipsos-Reid poll released in July 2002 reveals that nearly half
(47%) of Canadians are concerned about becoming a burden to someone when
they get older. And, one in four reports that they are concerned that they will
need to care for their parents when they get older. Interestingly, though, only
12% of Canadians are currently protected by private long-term care insurance.
21
A survey conducted in 1999 by the Commonwealth Fund found that 26%
of seniors in Canada with children reported that they often received help from
their children when they were ill. Rates in the four other countries surveyed
ranged from 30% to 37%.
The 2001 Canada Census reported that the proportion of the population over
15 years of age which devoted some time to caring for a senior was 18.2%.
22 This
will be an important indicator to monitor in coming years as more baby boomers
find themselves caring for aging parents and as they themselves move into the
over-65 age group. Around 2010, some 60% of boomers over the age of 50 will
have a surviving parent, as compared to just 16% of over-50s who had a surviving
parent in 1960.
23 Those who leave the workforce to take care of elderly parents
will inevitably contribute to labour shortages and to societal opportunity costs
in the form of lost productive capacity and potentially lost tax revenues.
24
21 Ipsos News Center. “Four in Ten (42%) Are Concerned They’ll Have to Care for Their Parents When They
Get Older.” July 10, 2002. http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1564
22 The changing profile of Canada’s labour force, Statistics Canada, Catalogue: 96F0030XIE2001009
23 As reported in The Ottawa Citizen “The baby boomers’ burden,” August 22, 2004, page D-1.
24 See note 21.
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Statistics Canada General Social Survey 2002
25 studied the health and financial
situation of informal caregivers providing care to people age 65 years. It found
that although many respondents indicated that care-giving was an opportunity
to strengthen relationships with the person they were providing care to, a
number of social, psychological and economic stresses were also identified.
Caregivers juggling competing demands, from full-time employment to other
care responsibilities, experienced guilt, disrupted sleep patterns, changes in
social activities and a lack of time for themselves. Other impacts and conflicts
reported include extra expenses, employment consequences such as reduced
hours of work, lost income, loss of job and delaying education or employment.
Known to be burdensome and stressful to many individuals, research has
further shown that caregivers who report strain associated with care-giving are
themselves at increased risk of developing their own health problems, including
depression, anxiety and lower levels of perceived health. One recent U.S. study
suggests that elderly care-giving spouses who experience mental or physical
strain are more likely to die than their non care-giving counterparts.
26
With an aging population, palliative end-of-life care issues are receiving
increasing attention. Statistics Canada projects that annual deaths will increase
40% from 227,620 in 2002, to 317,300 in 2020. About 75% of deaths in Canada
occur in a hospital setting or long-term care facility. Nevertheless, few hospitals
have palliative care beds and many people end up in hospital acute care beds,
thereby exacerbating existing hospital overcrowding and waiting list frustrations.
Research shows that 90% of Canadians would prefer to spend their final
days at home with the available home support services.
27According to a recent
Ipsos-Reid survey, Canadians estimate that it would take an average of 54
hours per week to take care of a dying loved one in their home. Considering
their current schedule, 64% of Canadians indicated that they could not devote
the estimated amount of time to do so.
28 A recent newspaper headline neatly
sums it up: “Death with dignity requires sacrifices from the living”.
29 Recent
government legislation on Employment Insurance Compassionate Care
Benefits provides some relief for working family members caring for a gravely
ill family member at risk of dying. Home care and other community supports
including respite care (services that give caregivers a break from the daily
routine of care-giving) as well as several innovative projects are available to
varying degrees across the country.
25 Stats Can 2002 General Social Survey, Cycle 16, Aging and Social Support, Caring for an aging society
(Catalogue no. 89-582-XIE).
26 Beach, S. and Schulz, R. “Is Caregiving a Risk Factor for Mortality?” Geriatric Times, May/June 2000 Vol. I,
Issue 1.
27 Quality End-of-Life Care Coalition. Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association. “Majority of Terminally-ill
Canadians Denied Hospice Palliative Care in Home Setting.” Press Release, September 9, 2004, Ottawa.
28 Ipsos News Center. Canadians on Hospital Palliative Care. May 5, 2004. http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/
pressrelease.cfm?id=2220
29 “Death with dignity requires sacrifices from the living.” The Ottawa Citizen. Sept 10, 2004, page F3.
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Urban and Rural Populations
Canada’s geography and population distribution present challenges for access
to health care. Like so much of the Canadian population, most seniors live in
urban areas. Populations shifting from rural to urban and suburban areas have
important implications for planning and delivery of health care services. Rural
and remote communities increasingly struggle with depopulation as young
people leave to pursue prospects in larger urban centres, while few newcomers
settle in these communities. Observably, the result is that those who stay behind
are aging and increasingly in need of more care and medical services. At the
same time, studies have shown that the health status of those living in rural and
remote regions of Canada lags behind that of urban residents, placing added
stress on the health system in the future.
30
While many communities, both urban and rural, are designated as
underserved areas in the context of physician recruitment and retention and are
experiencing other health professional shortages, the problems are particularly
acute in rural areas. Recruitment of professionals and the challenges in delivery
and access to services in rural areas have continued to command more attention
from government.
Health Status and Healthy Aging
There is an increasing focus on healthy aging and seniors’ wellness with the
goal of better quality of life. In fact, there are a number of commonly adopted
determinants of health which embody and seek to influence good health. Equally
applicable to the aging process and to the wellness of seniors, these include such
features as adequate income, education, housing, satisfying relationships and safe
environments. As promoted through public health policy, we have come to accept
that many of the diseases and the frailty associated with old age are alleviated with
positive changes in lifestyle, behaviour and favourable environmental conditions.
Generally, Canadians live their later years in good health. In 2003, 73.3%
of seniors 65 years of age and over in Canada said that their health was either
excellent (11.5%), very good (25.2%) or good (36.6%), while 26.6% reported
their health was fair or poor. Even the majority (67.8%) of seniors 75 years of age
and over describe their health as either excellent, very good or good compared
to 77.2% in the 65 – 74 age group. Still, those in the older age group 75 and
over, are more likely to describe their health as fair or poor (32.2%) compared
to the 65 – 74 age group, where the figure was 22.8%. Encouragingly, there
are some positive health indicators related to lifestyle. For example, about half
of seniors are physically active, with senior men tending to be more physically
active than senior women. Also, over 60% of seniors in the community have
been immunized for influenza.
30 Statistics Canada. The Health of Rural Canadians: A Rural-Urban Comparison of Health Indicators. Rural
and Small Town Canada, Analysis Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 6 (October 2003). 
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31 “Canada’s Aging Population,” Ministry of Public Works and Government Services, Canada, 2002;
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/seniors-aines.
32 See note 16. pp. 9 – 19.
Table 4 presents selected health indicators from the 2003 Canadian
Community Health Survey.
However, in spite of describing their health as good, more than four out
of five seniors living at home suffer from a chronic health condition. The
most common are arthritis and rheumatism, followed by high blood pressure,
allergies, back problems, chronic heart problems, cataracts and diabetes.
Injuries among seniors are a serious concern, with falls being the main cause
of those physical injuries. Serious enough, when one considers that total
health care costs resulting from seniors’ falls are estimated at $1 billion
annually.
31 It seems reasonable, therefore, that public prevention programs
should be augmented to reduce the incidence of falls.
From the available evidence, it is difficult to assess whether the health status
of Canadians is improving or declining. A review of the data by Hogan and Hogan
(2002) for the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada suggest that
baby boomers may be in better health than the current elderly and that Canadians
are generally living a greater proportion of their lives with a reasonable quality
of life likely due to better management of chronic conditions.
32
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Closing Remarks and Considerations
Health care is Canada’s number one priority and, as we have seen, it is the
largest and fastest growing government spending item. With the aging of the
baby boomers, a greater proportion of the population will move into the older and
more expensive ages. The significant increase in per-capita health expenditures
will put increased pressure on the system and its practitioners. The recent First
Ministers’10-year Health Care Accord will see an injection into the health care
system of $41 billion over the next ten years, but whether this is the “fix for a
generation” that was promised is considered debatable by some. Specific areas
that will help to meet the needs of an aging population include:
•  By 2005, the provinces will establish comparable benchmarks and indicators
in five areas: cancer, heart, diagnostic imaging, joint replacements and sight
restoration.
•  By 2006, the provinces will cover two weeks short-term acute home care;
two weeks short-term community mental health home care; and end-of-
life care (case management, nursing and the cost of palliative specific
pharmaceuticals).
•  By June 30, 2006, a pharmaceuticals strategy will be developed to include
options for catastrophic pharmaceutical coverage, a common National Drug
Formulary, purchasing strategies etc.
While beneficial and supportable, it is interesting that these initiatives do
not directly align with the most common ailments identified above.
Accurately forecasting future health expenditures is almost impossible and
it is likely that the 10-year deal negotiated by the provinces and the federal gov-
ernment will not endure the stress of 10 years. Further study and hard decisions
are urgently needed on fundamental points, such as the level of investment in
health care that we are willing to make and the shifting of responsibility from
public to private responsibility. Progress on these fronts will be more productive
if the potentially divisive issue of intergenerational equity and the burden on a
younger generation to support an aging population are adequately addressed.
Framing the discussions within a whole life course view in a society that values
and respects all age groups will be important. Finally, it bears keeping in mind
that “while health care may be Canadians’highest priority, it is not their only
priority.”
33 As we move forward, we must also not forget that the “health care
crisis” and constant rising costs in expenditures are a pre-existing condition not
solely attributable to population aging. Although population aging amplifies
its importance, we must be careful when considering corrective policies not to
be distracted from examining the other long-standing issues that have created
and underscored the supposed magnitude of the crisis.
33 Janice MacKinnon. “The Arithmetic of Health Care.” Policy Matters. July 2004, Vol. 5, no. 3.
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34 William Robson. “Will the Baby Boomers Bust the Health Budget?” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary. 
No. 148, February 2001. p. 2.
35 See note 32, 23.
In the following pages, we will explore areas that require serious attention
and consideration as the health care system evolves. Ideas on how to address
current and future pressures of the health care system are presented with a view
to guiding meaningful debate in the way that Canadians embrace challenges
and opportunities of the current landscape.
Restructuring the Financing of Health Care Delivery
The need for longer-term reform directed to restructuring the financing of
health care delivery is repeatedly raised but has nevertheless not yet attracted
substantive change in that direction. Some claim that health care costs of an
aging population will be manageable in an economy that is growing and one
in which government revenues can be expected to swell in equal magnitude.
However, there are fears that the current pay-as-you-go approach to health
care budgeting is unsustainable and that it places a disproportionate share of
the burden of caring for elderly baby boomers on the ensuing generations.
Pressures placed on the health care system by an aging population are real and
can be more easily managed if appropriate planning and actions are taken now
at a time when economic conditions and federal budget surpluses make it
relatively easier to do so. 
Many studies have explored alternate models based on internal reforms as
well as non-taxed-based sources of financing. Some of the options to financing
public health expenditures to cover increased demand for health services include:
•  Cutting back on health services (e.g., de-listing of some covered services);
•  Raising taxes or introducing user fees to cover pay-as-you go expenditures;
•  Diverting resources from other uses; and
•  Pre-funding future health care expenditures from current taxation.
In light of public debate, the first three alternatives are considered unlikely
to be widely accepted. The last alternative may however be more congruent
with current social tolerance. The C.D. Howe Institute in its health paper “Will
the Baby Boomers Bust the Health Budget?” (Robson, 2001) presents this
approach which is based on quantifying increased health care spending in
present-value terms, like other fiscal obligations and preparing for larger future
budgets by saving more in the short term.
34 This approach was also supported in
a discussion paper prepared for the Commission on the Future of Health Care in
Canada.
35 Robson proposes a pair of reforms to address an aging population’s
health care needs as well as end the history of ad hoc deals between the federal
government and the provinces. First, it recommends a “seniors’health grant” be
built into the federal government’s Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST)
for the purpose of allocating new money to the provinces in proportion to the
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growth in their populations age 65 and over. The grant would be set at a fixed
amount per senior and adjusted annually via an escalator provision tied to the
nominal GDP. Secondly, it recommends providing the required funding for the
grant through a “seniors’ health account”, which would pre-fund some of the
future costs related to seniors’ health care. This fund, operating in a fashion
similar to that of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) account, would grow over the
next two decades. The combination of these two reforms would serve to reduce
the burden that paying for the baby boomers imposes on future generations. 
Another option is to look at a compulsory insurance scheme like employment
insurance. The Conference Board of Canada proposed that insurance premiums
be considered as a funding source instead of general taxation. The approach is
based on the use of sound actuarial data to determine the required insurance
premium for a given basket of services and allowing for increased choice around
any premium increases needed to fund the system.
36
Private long-term care insurance is also receiving more attention as a source
of new revenue. Like other insurance, it provides some security and peace of
mind around the accessibility to, and affordability of, needed care without
placing undue economic and emotional burden onto family members. This
insurance can cover the cost of bringing professional care into the home as well
as provide choices for individuals who need more intrusive services typically
afforded in a care home. This kind of security may be especially welcome for
women who are most vulnerable, as many will outlive their husbands and may
be facing financial pressures in widowhood.
37
Other Health System Reforms to Meet the Needs of Seniors
Health system reform revolves around ensuring an effective and efficient
system that provides the right service, at the right time, in the right place, by
the right provider. Some of the more viable reforms that are reshaping the
health care system and which warrant enthusiastic contemplation are presented.
Properly introduced and managed, these reforms will improve quality of care
and help mitigate the escalation of health care costs that can be expected with
or without the existence of an aging matrix.
Primary Care Reform
Much focus is currently being placed on reforms targeting primary care.
Conceivably, as the first point of entry to the system, improvements in access
and delivery of primary care will have significant impact across the entire
system. The ability of the primary care sector to respond to an aging population
will be paramount. This will include emphasis on healthy aging and the provision
of assessment, treatment and care by appropriately trained professionals using
a multidisciplinary approach and with access to specialized geriatric services.
36 See note 49, p. 94.
37 See note 23, Author Patty Randall who wrote the book Let’s Talk — The Care Years: Taking Care of Our
Parents and Planning for Ourselves is interviewed for this article.
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Human Resources Planning
Health reforms must also address health professional shortages, an aging
health care workforce and growing expenditures related to the recruitment and
retention of health human resources. Many of the points raised later in this
report on how to address labour and skill shortages are equally applicable to
the health sector. In short, effective human resource planning is essential to the
future of the health system. Federal, provincial and territorial governments need
to make policy commitments to a workforce plan for physicians, nurses and
other health professionals to deal with issues such as recruitment, licensing
and credentialing standards, training, use of international health care graduates
and geographic distribution of health human resources. The popular approaches
of physician recruitment and retention should be re-examined and broadened
to include a more proactive component that deals with sponsorship of foreign
doctors and preparation of new entrants to the profession.
Strategies directed at improving productivity and reducing costs would
include the use of technology, skills upgrading, enhancing scope of practice
(e.g., use of nurse practitioners to take on some physician functions), alternative
payment forms and use of evidence-based practices. Greater efforts are needed
to increase the numbers of health professionals specializing in geriatric care,
such as geriatricians, geriatric psychiatrists, family physicians with training in
health care of the elderly and geriatric nurse practitioners. And this planning
must be more closely tied to, and evaluated against, the vision for the health care
system of the future. As an example, if we want to achieve a certain level of
home care by 2025, what are the types and numbers of professionals and health
care workers that we need and where will they be needed? More importantly,
where will we get them?
Admittedly, many of these improvements will have a greater impact on quality
of care as opposed to strict staffing corrections, but are nevertheless beneficial
to addressing broader worker shortages and rising health expenditures.
Technological Advances
Technological advances have the potential to increase or decrease health care
costs. Better use of existing technology, such as telehealth, could have a beneficial
impact on health costs although it could also increase costs by improving access
to services. This is the modern dilemma, and one which health planners have
been grappling with. Predicting new technological advances is not possible and
the effect of technological advances may be two-sided. Technological progress
may generate overall savings only if applications result in ways to prevent
disease or reduce the cost of treatment to existing clients. Oftentimes, it is the
exact opposite which occurs, as the result is increased demand and a wider
range of expensive diagnostic tools and treatments. A case in point is that of
pharmaceuticals, for which expenditures now are second only to hospital
expenditures. New and better drugs may divert hospitalization costs but they
will also push drug expenditures upward. A standardized cost-benefit model
effective human resource
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of alternative assessment must be introduced and objectively implemented if
technological advances are to have any positive outcomes of a fiscal nature.
Home Care Versus Institutional Care
Reduced hospitalization and postponement of institutionalization can decrease
costs, enhance quality of life and provide greater choice for seniors. We know
that, based on research, most people would prefer to stay in their own homes
rather than move into an institution. The focus needs to be on providing care
in the most appropriate setting and helping seniors and families to manage
transitions in care from hospital to community. Investments in new infrastructure
and programs must take into account the expectations and needs of the baby
boomers that will make up tomorrow’s seniors. An emphasis on creating
senior-friendly physical and behavioural environments in both public and
private spaces makes good sense for people of all ages. 
The following list outlines some of the ways to support “aging in place”
allowing seniors to remain in their homes as long as possible:
•  Allocating more resources to home care and community supports. Currently,
provinces and territories spend an average of between 4% and 5% of their
health budgets on home care. The rate of growth in this sector has been
increasing; however, there are disparities across the country in terms of
eligibility and coverage and there is no national home care program. The
recent Health Care Agreement, while a good initiative, only makes modest
steps on the home-care front.
•  Recognizing and supporting informal caregivers who are expected to take
on more responsibility. For example, respite care can help caregivers get a
reprieve from their care-giving duties. A range of respite services can include
temporary breaks, a personal emergency system, information and training on
care-receiver needs, adult day programs for the care receiver, housekeeping,
outdoor home maintenance, counselling and peer support. Government and
business have begun to accept more important roles in supporting caregivers.
The Federal Government’s EI Compassionate Leave Program is a start in that
direction. Other ways that employers and government can support work/life
balance, through flexible work environments and “life course flexibility,”
are discussed later in this paper. These strategies could collectively form a
national caregiver framework that respects caregivers and allows them to
choose appropriate supports from a range of options.
•  Since spouses are generally the best source of support, enhancing joint
survivorship of both husband and wife should be encouraged; this includes
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38 Canadian Institutes of Health Research Communiqué May 6, 2003, “The Honourable Sharon Carstairs
Announces $400,000 for Aging Research.”
•  Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) offers two programs:
one for seniors, “Home Adaptations for Seniors’Independence” (HASI) and
the other for persons with disability that is also available to seniors, “Residential
Rehabilitation Assistance Program for Persons with Disabilities” (RRAP).
Under the HASI program,CMHC provides a forgivable loan of up to $3,500 for
adaptations of a minor nature that meet the needs of seniors with an age-related
disability. Qualifying items under the program include such products as handrails,
walk-in showers with grab bars, bathtub grab bars and seats etc. To qualify for
assistance, the homeowner must be over 65 years of age, having difficulty with
daily living activities due to aging and must agree to continue to occupy the
house for at least six months. To qualify, total household income must be
below a specified limit subject to area and the dwelling must be a permanent
residence. If the adaptation work is being done to a rental unit, the landlord is
eligible for the forgivable loan provided he/she does not increase rent as a result.
Under the RRAP program, CMHC provides forgivable loans to homeowners
and landlords to undertake accessibility work to the dwelling to be occupied by
a person with disability. For a homeowner to qualify, the value of the house must
not exceed specified assessment amounts and household income must likewise
be within specified limits subject to household size and area. Concurrently, the
homeowner must agree to continue to occupy the home for the term of the loan. For
a landlord to qualify, rental income must not exceed a fixed ceiling and the unit(s)
must be occupied by tenants having incomes below the specified income ceilings.
Depending on region, a homeowner can access between $16,000 and $24,000
and a landlord/tenant can access between $24,000 and $36,000 of financing. 
Focus on Quality Rather Than Quantity of Life
The foundations for a healthy and enriching old age are laid early in life. As
well, healthy aging goes beyond health care and healthy lifestyles to encompass
the broader determinants of health such as adequate income, housing, education,
social supports and transportation. Therefore, understanding and promoting
healthy aging needs to be integrated into a population health approach for
healthy aging communities. The Canadian Longitudinal Study on Aging (CLSA),
funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and Health Canada, is
an important initiative undertaken to better understand the determinants of
healthy aging as well as the causes and evolution of the diseases associated
with aging, such as cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes and dementia.
Announced in May 2003, the first step in the CLSA is the development over
an 18-month period of the research protocol to outline how the study will be
conducted. Once completed and approved, the implementation of the protocol
is expected to involve following thousands of Canadians over an approximate
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Research focused on chronic diseases could have huge potential cost-saving
impacts, depending on the costs of the treatment. For example, we know that
the cost of caring for people with Alzheimer disease is very high and growing
every year. The Alzheimer Society in the United States estimates that if the
onset of the disease could be delayed by five years, they would save $50 billion
per year.
39
Programs and initiatives related to health promotion, primary prevention
such as the prevention of falls and secondary prevention with respect to living
with chronic diseases like diabetes can all have an important impact in
improving quality of life and healthy aging for seniors.
We know that health care expenditures peak in the last year or two of life.
Increasingly, seniors and society have more choices on how they wish to face
death and dying. Palliative care in the community, compared to the hospital
setting, may result in cost savings. Palliative care experts recommend that
Health Canada develop a national approach to palliative home care service and
that governments provide the financial resources for research, training and
education (e.g., enhancing pain management knowledge on the part of 
community nurses and family physicians), as well as the services to support
families throughout and beyond the care process. Another related area is that
of advanced-care directives (or living wills). These are specific instructions,
prepared in advance, that are intended to direct a person’s medical care if he
or she becomes unable to do so in the future. In this way, patients can make
their own decisions regarding the care they would prefer to receive if they
develop a terminal illness or contract a life-threatening injury. Research from
the U.S. showed that those with advance directives cost only 32% as much as
those without. Analysis of the potential effect of advance directives in Canada
suggest significant savings could be attained, initially 5.9% in immediate
savings growing to 6.7% by 2075 (Brown and Suresh, 2003).
40 A study at
McMaster University also found that the use of directives resulted in less use
of health care resources.
41 However, it is important to also raise some of the
concerns associated with living wills, notably that with the changes in medical
technology and health conditions, it is very difficult to predict years in advance
the treatments that you would want or not want. Advance directives are not
generally well known in Canada although the Ontario Alzheimer Strategy
included advance directives on care choices as one of its ten initiatives. It takes
a comprehensive approach which includes providing information related to
the planning that individuals and families need to undertake, such as durable
power of attorney for health care. While this may be a controversial and
sensitive topic, it is timely for Canada to open up a national dialogue on the
ethical decisions around dying, as other countries have done.
39 See note 7, p. 107.
40 Robert L. Brown and Uma Suresh. “Further Analysis of Future Canadian Health Care Costs.” Institute of
Insurance and Pension Research. 2003. http://www.stas.uwaterloo.ca/Stats_Dept/IIPR/2003_reports/
03-07.pdf
41 “McMaster study findings support the use of advance directives in long-term care system.” March 14, 2000
McMaster University Health Sciences. http://www-fhs.mcmaster.ca/pubrel/advdirect.htm
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 Labour Supply Concerns  8
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The shift in age structure of the population in Canada and across the world,
which is at the crux of this demographic revolution, dictates our workforce
and labour supply patterns. We now have an aging workforce and as the baby
boomers are nearing retirement age, there are concerns that there will not be
a sufficient number of skilled workers to replace them. Compounding this
problem is that in the last few years, retirement before the age 65 has been
more popular and even encouraged, not only in public and private sectors 
but also as part of our culture’s norm. Will the greying of our population lead to
reduced productivity and hinder our competitiveness in an era of technological
innovations and market globalization? 
Key Findings Relating to the Labour Supply
•  In 2001, the median age within the core working group (20 – 64) was 41.3
years and by 2011 is projected to rise to 43.7.
•  In Canada today, there are about 19 retirees for every 100 workers. The
elderly dependency ratio is projected to rise by 2030 to 39 retirees for 100
workers and by 2050 to 44 retirees for every 100 workers.
•  The ratio between people aged 60 – 64 years (those who reduce their hours
of work or who leave the workforce) and those aged 20 to 24 years (those
who are entering the workforce) was below 0.5:1.0 until the end of the
1980s, but is now at 0.6:1.0, which means that for every six people who
leave, 10 people enter the workforce. In economic terms, this tells us that
supply exceeds demand. However, the ratio is expected to continue to rise
and will equalize by around 2016, and by 2026 it is predicted that for every
13 people who leave the workforce, only 10 people will enter.
•  Based on the 2002 Canadian Labour Force Survey, the average age of
retirement in Canada is 61.2 years.
•  Two-thirds of Canadians retire before the full Canada Pension Plan/Quebec
Pension Plan benefit age of 65, oftentimes involuntarily.
•  Between 1987 and 1990, 29% of people retired before the age of 60 years.
That rate grew to 43% between 1997 and 2000. Early retirement is more
common in the public sector, where the average retirement age in 1999 was
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58.5 years, compared to 61.3 years in the private sector and 65.0 years for
the self-employed.
•  Generally, seniors over 65 are retired, but a small proportion, about 6%,
are still economically active. More senior men (about 10%) are in the
labour force compared to women (about 3.5%). Overall, seniors comprise
less than 2% of the total workforce in Canada. It should be noted that more
than half of these seniors are self-employed and many are employed on a
part-time basis. 
•  The drop in the labour force participation rate of boomers, along with the
smaller millennium bust cohort entering the labour force, will result in an
average annual labour force growth forecast of only 0.5% between 2011
and 2015. No labour force growth is expected from 2016 to 2025. 
•  The education and health care sectors are particularly at risk of losing a
large share of their workforce due to low retirement ages taken in tandem
with generous retirement incentives and the nature of the professions’
maturity.
•  Other sectors experiencing shortages of skilled workers include skilled
construction trades people, medical technologists and technicians, aircraft
mechanics and police officers. 
•  Recent research by the Canadian Policy Research Networks examines a
number of case studies that demonstrate that age structure alone does not
determine future skill shortages. Three other key factors that affect skill
shortage include the length of time required to train, the geographic mobility
of workers and working conditions that make it difficult to attract or retain
workers.
The Aging Labour Force
Labour force aging is taking place within the context of overall population
aging. The median age
42 for the working age population in Canada is increasing
as shown in Figure 29. In 2001, the median age within the core working group
(20 – 64) was 41.3 years and by 2011 is projected to rise to 43.7.
Dependency ratios presented in Figure 2 give a rough indicator of economic
dependence. In Canada today, there are about 19 retirees for every 100 workers.
The elderly dependency ratio is projected to rise by 2030 to 39 retirees for 100
workers and by 2050 to 44 retirees for every 100 workers. 
42 The median age of a population is that age that divides a population into two groups of the same size,
such that half of the total population is younger than this age, and the other half is older.
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Another demographic indicator that is helpful in tracking labour supply is
the ratio between people aged 60 – 64 years (those who reduce their hours of
work or who leave the workforce) and those aged 20 to 24 years (those who
are entering the workforce). This quotient was approximately 50% until the
end of the 1980s but now exceeds 60%, which means that for every six people
who leave, 10 people enter the workforce. In economic terms, this tells us that
supply exceeds demand. However, the ratio is expected to continue to rise and
will equalize around 2016, and by 2026 it is predicted that for every 13 people
who leave, only 10 people will enter.
  72
Labour force growth trends are occurring at different rates in different
parts of the world and will affect global workforce distribution in the coming
decades (see Table 5). Italy, Japan and Europe will experience the largest
declines in the labour force growth in contrast to countries like India, China and
Mexico, which will experience exceptional gain. The number of working age
people in India is expected to increase by 337 million between 2000 and 2030,
with its working population later set to surpass that of China. Interestingly,
Canada will experience a net growth of 9.5% in working age populace between
2000 and 2010 but will stagnate for not less than 20 years thereafter. 
Early Retirement
Retirement ages have been steadily dropping in developed countries. This is
reflected in the percentage of people over 65 years of age still in the labour force
(see Figure 31). Workers in Western Europe are entitled to receive unreduced
retirement benefits at age 60. In France, Italy and Germany, less than 5% of
the total population age 65 and over are in the labour force.
43
43 The figure is somewhat higher if only working men are considered.
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Compared to the United States, Canada has a lower average retirement age
and a lower percentage of people over 65 years of age in the workforce. Based
on the 2002 Canadian Labour Force Survey, the average age of retirement in
Canada is 61.2 years. Two-thirds of Canadians retire before the full Canada
Pension Plan/Quebec Pension Plan benefit age of 65 years. Between 1987 and
1990, 29% of people retired before the age of 60. That rate grew to 43% between
1997 and 2000. As we might suspect, early retirement is more common in the
public sector, where the average retirement age in 1999 was 58.5 years,compared
to 61.3 years in the private sector and 65.0 years for the self-employed.
44
While the average age of retirement is lower for women than it is for men,
women make up an increasing share of the older workforce. Over the past 25
years, the participation rate of women aged 45 – 54 and 55 – 64 has increased
by 28.1% and 9.9% respectively. In the same time period, the participation rate
for men aged 45 – 54 and 55 – 64 dropped by 3.2% and 14.6% respectively.
The following graph illustrates that about one third of people age 60 – 64
participate in Canada’s paid workforce. Generally, seniors over 65 are retired,
but a small proportion, about 6%, are still economically active. More senior
men (about 10%) are in the workforce compared to women (about 3.5%).
Overall, seniors comprise less than 2% of the total workforce in Canada and
44 Challenges of an Aging Workforce: An overview of the issue. May 2002, Human Resources Development
Canada.
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it should be noted that more than half of these seniors are self-employed and
many are employed on a part-time basis.
Technology
The incredible advances in technology have changed the way we live and work.
Advancements in global communication are serving to bring us all closer
together — a virtual shrinking of the world if you will. Working and learning
at a distance and from our homes has become easier and more popular in the
last decade and is expected to persist. There is agreement among experts that
population aging is occurring at a time when technological changes and market
globalization are transforming industrialized countries from resource-based
economies to knowledge-driven economies. This shift has underscored how
human capital is in itself an important engine of growth and one which promotes
an accentuation of a highly skilled workforce. In one of their studies, Mérette
and Fougère estimate that human capital investment (post-secondary education,
training and retraining) is likely to increase in response to the effects of population
aging.
45Allowing us to enlarge the effective labour force, increased investment
in training and skills renewal serves also to slow the pace of anticipated erosion
or shrinking of the wage-income tax base. In the future, should employers chose
to invest in older workers as they do in the younger groups, simultaneously
creating incentive for them to remain actively employed, it is likely that older
workers would delay retirement. Such a strategy would reduce the demands
45 Maxime Fougère and Marcel Mérette, “Population Ageing, Intergenerational Equity and Growth: Analysis
with Endogenous Growth Overlapping Generations Model,” Department of Finance, January 1999.
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placed on social income programs and help spread the burden of income
taxation that would otherwise fall upon the younger workers.
It is commonly accepted that:
•  Technology has also reduced much of the physical demand in the past
required of many occupations, making the work day less physically taxing. 
•  In the past, work could only be conducted in the workplace while today
working from home is not uncommon and very popular among the
self-employed.
•  Self-employment posted its second consecutive yearly gain with an increase
of 37,000 people in 2002 and another 67,000 in 2003.
46
•  Based on a number of studies, self-employed individuals tend to work longer
than do paid employees. If these trends continue, the increasing proportion
of the self-employed in the Canadian labour force is likely to cause a rise
in the average age of retirement.
•  Few people plan or predetermine the age at which they will retire, with the
exception perhaps of those tempted by early retirement incentives. Most
Canadians seem to prefer remaining somewhat active and productive for as
long as they can. A number of them contribute to the volunteer sector while
still others chose to come out of retirement and take on a new kind of work
that is more suitable to their lifestyle. 
•  Aside from the fact that older workers are less likely to participate in job
training programs, there is little empirical evidence that shows that older
workers are less productive than younger ones. 
One study supported by the Policy Research Initiative has shown that
retirement, as a self-reported event, actually occurs relatively infrequently.
Among males, only about 16% of all job separations occurring from age 50
to 65 are reported as retirements, and for females only 12%.
47 This leads us
to believe that in most cases, older workers are essentially displaced due to
layoff, illness, disability or a family related event. 
Labour Shortages and Skill Shortages
Most analysts agree that Canada will be facing labour shortages but that these
will not occur over the balance of this decade. Instead, finding employment for
46 Geoff, Bowlby, “The Labour Market in 2003,” Perspectives on Labour and Income, Volume 5, No. 1,
January 2004 (Catalogue No. 75-001-XIE, Statistics Canada). 
47 Rowe, Geoff and Huan Nguyen (2002), “Older Workers and the Labour Market,” Perspectives on Labour
and Income (3(12), Catalogue No. 75-001-XIE, Statistics Canada). 
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the large numbers of baby boom echo generation entrants to the labour market
will be a challenge over the next few years. The focus of employment policy
continues to be on ensuring that young people have the skills and training to
meet the needs of the job market.
However, there will be mounting pressures on the labour market in the next
decade as baby boomers begin to retire around the year 2012, and this will
continue beyond 2025. The drop in the labour force participation rate of boomers
along with the smaller millennium bust cohort entering the labour force will
result in an average annual labour force growth forecast of only 0.5% between
2011 and 2015. No labour force growth is expected from 2016 to 2025.
There is evidence that there are current and pending localized skill shortages
in terms of geography, industry or occupation. The education and health care
sector are particularly at risk of losing a large share of their workforce due to
young retirement ages and older age structures of those professions. The Canadian
Nurses Association has estimated a shortage of over 100,000 nurses by 2011,
and the Association of Colleges and Universities predicts that over the next
decade they will need to recruit at least 30,000 new faculty members.
48 Other
sectors experiencing shortages of skilled workers include skilled construction
trades-people, medical technologists and technicians, aircraft mechanics and
police officers.
49
It is important to recognize that skill shortages are affected by a number of
factors and processes, of which the aging population is only one. Recent research
by the Canadian Policy Research Networks examines a number of case studies
that demonstrate that age structure alone does not determine future skill shortages.
Three other key factors found to affect skill shortage include the length of time
required to train, the geographic mobility of workers and working conditions
that make it difficult to attract or retain workers.
50 In fact, based on that research
there is no evidence of a crisis or a looming general shortage of skilled labour
in Canada as a direct result of demographic aging. Although the aging of the
labour force has certainly heightened existing concerns about labour shortages,
upon closer examination,these shortages may be more related to wages,the nature
of the work itself and education and training policies rather than to demographics. 
In the next section, we examine how employers, policy makers and individuals
can make adjustments aimed at averting looming labour shortages. Depending
on the relative success of such measures, we may not face generalized labour
force shortages of alarming magnitudes.
Closing Remarks and Considerations
Labour and skills shortages can be addressed by promoting skills development
and workforce participation of all available workers, both current and future.
48 Report by the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, “Competing for Immigrants,” June 11,
2002 as cited in Performance and Potential 2003 – 2004, The Conference Board of Canada.
49 Performance and Potential 2003 – 2004, The Conference Board of Canada.
50 Julie Ann McMullin and Martin Cooke. Labour Force Aging and Skill Shortages in Canada and Ontario.
Canadian Policy Research Networks, August 2004.
there are current and
pending localized skill
shortages in terms of
geography, industry or
occupation with the 
education and health care
sector particularly at risk 
            77
Ways to increase size and preparation of the workforce include:
•  Raising reproduction rates;
• Increasing  immigration;
•  Improving labour force participation within select groupings;
•  Promoting and supporting policy intent on a younger workforce;
•  Helping older workers stay in the workforce longer; and
• Recruitment  strategies.
None of the strategies listed above offers a complete solution on its own,
rather a combination of changes in public policy and practice directed to all
of these elements stands the best chance of having a sufficient impact on
anticipated labour shortages.
Raising Reproduction Rates
Since the aging phenomenon is brought on in part by falling fertility rates,
efforts can be directed to reverse this trend to slow population decline and the
pace of increase in the elderly dependency ratio. Of course, this will not help to
address labour shortages in the near and medium term and would increase the
total dependency ratio. However, over the long term a rise in reproduction would
help to moderate the rise in the elderly dependency ratio. Incentive-induced
policies to encourage young people to start having families again, such as baby
bonuses, facilitating adoption rules and processes and enhancing maternity and
paternity leave and benefits, have had limited levels of success in a number of
jurisdictions.
51 52 It has been found that such policies could negatively
impact on the number of women in the workforce and would therefore need
to be complemented by policies around childcare innovations and other
support that promote co-existence of paid labour and families. It is important
to recognize that many social and economic factors affect reproduction rates,
which, taken collectively, make fertility rates difficult to predict. Some have
legitimately defended the notion that, in most developing countries, higher
reproduction rates would not significantly impact elderly dependency ratios.
53
Increasing Immigration and Finding Help Outside Our Borders
One strategy to meet expected labour and skill shortages is through increased
immigration. There has been considerable debate and analysis of the pros and
cons of this approach and to using immigration as a means to offset an aging
population proclivity. A number of analysts have concluded that increased
immigration alone will not prevent the reduction in the size of the Canadian
labour force.
54 A recent essay published by the Institute for Research and
51 See note 7, pp. 56 – 57. 
52 Quebec is one of the provinces in Canada that has experimented with incentives for child birth. Studies at
the University of Toronto and the University of Quebec in Montreal on Quebec Baby Bonuses suggest that
these programs were effective in increasing the fertility rate. http://www.realwomenca.com/newsletter/
2001_Jan_Feb/article_3.html.
53 See note 7, Appendix on The Global Aging Initiative Demographic Series Study, pp 116 – 140.
54 See note 50. See p. 34 for a brief overview of studies on immigration and labour related issues.
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Public Policy presents a case for a youth-focused immigration policy as a way
to restore a balanced group of ages in the population.
55 These immigrant youth
and children would be educated and trained in Canada, and would be relied
upon to fill future labour shortages.
Polices designed to target skilled worker immigration, both temporary and
permanent, can mitigate localized skill shortages. However, with similar labour
shortages anticipated in other countries, Canada will have to compete for skilled
immigrants and will need to demonstrate that it stands out as an attractive place
to live and work. Some problems in the current system, such as the length of
time in processing applications, the assessment of foreign credentials and the
lower average employment rate and wages of new immigrants, need to be
resolved.
56 One way is for government to work with employers to target and
fast-track temporary and permanent recruitment of immigrants with specific
skills. Another is for greater recognition of the qualifications and experience
of immigrants to facilitate their entry into the labour market.
Offshore outsourcing, becoming increasingly popular, is another way to
benefit from a labour supply residing outside of Canada. With advances in
communications technology as well as lower costs of transportation, it makes
increasing sense to “bring work to people instead of people to work.”
57 This
practice allows lower-skilled jobs to move to economies having lower labour
costs while more recently granting an outlet for professional and administrative
overflows. Global sub-contracting for the manufacture of goods has been a
reality of global economics for some years and more recently, service jobs
in information technology are moving offshore to countries such as India,
China, Ireland and the Philippines. Nevertheless, offshore outsourcing is a
topic of considerable debate particularly with respect to the potentially negative
short-term impacts on local employment.
58 Governments have an important
role to play in helping displaced workers adjust. Interestingly, a recent report
by the UN Conference on Trade and Development identifies Canada as a
significant player on both sides of the offshore services trade as result of
contracting out high technology jobs offshore while also attracting offshore
service work from the United States, including call centre services, information
technology projects, regional headquarters infrastructure and even filmmaking.
59
Improving Labour Force Participation by Specific Groups 
Improvements in education, training and labour force participation could be
directed to specific, traditionally under-represented groups including women,
aboriginal groups and people with disabilities. In Canada, participation by
women in the labour force has increased dramatically since the 1950s
55 Tom Kent. “In the National Interest: A Social Policy Agenda for a New Century — Restore Cooperative
Federalism, Modernize Medicare, Put Children First.” Policy Options. August 2004.
56 Elizabeth McIssac, “Immigrants in Canadian Cities: Census 2001 — What Do the Data Tell us?” Institute
for Research on Public Policy, May 2003.
57 William B.P. Robson. “Aging Population and the Workforce: Challenges for Employers.” A British North
America Committee Statement, October 2001, http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/BNAC_Aging_Populations.pdf.
58 “Offshore outsourcing divides US ITers.” ComputerWeekly.com, August 25, 2004.
59 “Offshoring of jobs big benefit for Canada.” Globeandmail.com, September 23, 2004. 
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although some gains may still be made in this area. Greater education and
training for women, as well as more flexible work arrangements, can help to
enhance the numbers of women in the workforce. For example, providing
public childcare may improve the ability of single mothers to participate in
training or skills development. Aboriginal people may also represent an
untapped potential, given that they represent up to 4.5% of the young age
cohorts but have lower labour force participation than other Canadians.
60
Removing barriers for people who are on social assistance or unemployed
so that they can avail themselves of education and training will help move
more people into the labour market and into jobs with identified shortages.
Currently, in some instances, people on social assistance cannot access student
loans to attend post-secondary schools. Also, most supported education and
training provided to people on social assistance or employment insurance is
designed for early re-entry to the labour market and not for acquiring skills
which are necessarily responsive to demand in the future.
61
Promoting and Supporting a Younger Workforce
Increased time is being spent in formal post-secondary education before
commencement of work such that people enter the workforce today at a later
age than in the past. Changes to the school system, including a longer school
year, could allow potential workers to graduate with the appropriate skills at
an earlier age. More apprenticeship and on-the-job training by employers
would accommodate an earlier exit from the formal education system and
should be pursued, especially in areas relating to the trades. The intent is not
to shorten education, since the key to future development of a skilled labour
force is education, training and lifelong learning, but rather to produce a more
responsive system within which people can succeed. Effectively serving to
combat some currently anticipated shortages, the academic system must continue
to promote flexibility such that academic pursuits match the professional
aspirations of its benefactors.
A report released in September 2004 by Randstad Canada, an international
employment services firm, stresses the need for employers to recognize the
importance of hiring, training and motivating the younger workforce.
62 As
older baby boom workers are now moving into the 55-and-over age cohorts,
relatively large numbers of members of Generation Y, age 18 to 24, are entering
into the labour market. They will be followed by smaller numbers of millennium
busters. Although a shortage of job applicants in the next decade is not expected,
employers need to be actively recruiting and retaining enough young people to
replace retiring baby boomers. It behoves employers to better understand the
demographics of the upcoming labour force. For example, the Randstad report
describes Gen Yers as having higher education levels and higher expectations.
60 See note 54.
61 See note 60.
62 “The young and restless generation: 18-to-24s expect success, and fast.” The Ottawa Citizen, September 23,
2004, p. A1 – A2.
employers need to be
actively recruiting and
retaining enough young
people to replace retiring
baby boomers
        80
To these younger workers, opportunities for training and personal development
rank highly as a desirable employment priority. Employers can accommodate
Gen Y employees by accepting to mentor, challenge and respect them and by
providing an environment oriented to personal learning and enjoyment.
With the larger numbers of children of baby boomers working their way
through the system, it is worthwhile noting that historically, youth labour
participation rates have been highly sensitive to a bleak job environment. High
unemployment rates tend to act as a deterrent to workforce entry as some
young people decide to stay in, or return to, school while some simply become
discouraged from looking for meaningful work. Therefore, policies that lower
unemployment and that enjoin social responsibility to provide opportunity
would help to reduce the negative impact on youth participation.
63 64
Helping Older Workers Stay in the Workforce Longer
The average worker entering the workforce at age 22 and retiring at 61 will
have spent about half of his or her lifetime in the workforce. Ironically, just as
longevity is increasing and physical work demands are lessening, the duration of
peoples’work lives are dropping. The OECD has proposed that policies geared
to extending work life be a priority for countries with aging populations.
65
Studies by the Policy Research Initiative support the reversing of early retirement
as one of the most effective ways to combat potential skill shortages.
66 Removing
incentives for early retirement, eliminating mandatory retirement ages and
increasing the age eligibility for public pensions are measures that are being
implemented or explored in a number of countries. Reaction to such measures
will be dependent in part upon how they are introduced and implemented.
Motivating workers to stay longer in the workforce requires progressive policies
that balance work and family life and introduce greater flexibility and choice.
A number of these issues are expanded upon below.
Mandatory Retirement
Despite attempts to explicitly eradicate age discrimination in Canada, the
contractual mandatory retirement (CMR) terms of many collective agreements
and employer pension plans compel workers to retire not later than age 65. A
number of countries, including the United States,Australia and New Zealand,
have banned CMR. In Canada, Manitoba and Quebec are the only provinces
having prohibited CMR outright while, in 1986, Ottawa outlawed CMR for
federal civil servants. For a few occupations, such as firefighters and airline
pilots, mandatory retirement is allowed where age criteria can be supported as
demonstrated “bona fide occupational requirement.” A recent study on CMR
63 Following the 1990 – 91 recession, downsizing reduced the number of entry-level positions, forcing a sharp
increase in youth unemployment. The youth participation rate dropped from 81.2% in 1989 to 75.5% in 1997.
The overall participation rate also declined from 67.5% in 1989 to 64.8% on 1997, but not by as much as the
youth component. Performance and Potential 2003 – 2004. The Conference Board of Canada, p. 86.
64 “Strengthening Growth and Public Finances in an Era of Demographic Change.” OECD, May 7, 2004, p. 10.
65 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1998. “Work Force Aging: Consequences and
Policy Responses.” 
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by the C.D. Howe Institute (June 2004) presents economic and social arguments
to support its recommendation that the remaining provinces ban mandatory
retirement in both the public and private sectors.
The report reviews evidence on the effect of the abolition of CMR and
concludes that it is unlikely to have a major impact on average retirement ages
or on the number of years of work. About half of Canadians are in jobs with
CMR and an estimated 6 – 20% of them would like to continue working past
65 years of age. Therefore, it is conceivable that only an additional 3 – 10%
of the total number of workers would work beyond the age 65 years. If they
work an additional three years, this would only add one to four months to
national average working lives.
67
Working beyond 65 may be more appealing to some groups which might
want to qualify for larger pension benefits based on years of service, those
wishing to increase lifetime earnings or savings and to those who would simply
wish to remain active or productive. Applicable to all sectors and classes of
society, such concession could be particularly attractive to women and other
late entrants to the labour force, those impacted by marriage breakdowns, as
well as to recent immigrants. Abolishment of mandatory retirement would
place all the provinces of Canada on a level playing field in the recruitment
and retention of talent and could help to curtail the controversial “brain drain”
to the United States, where retirement is not forced. And while some labour
groups and others oppose the movement to ban mandatory retirement, there is
considerable support for the approach. In fact, 65-year-old Prime Minister
Paul Martin announced in December 2003 that he does not support mandatory
retirement, while the Government of Ontario has declared that it is committed
to ending mandatory retirement. Towards that end, the Government of Ontario
is currently conducting public consultations on how to best put an end to the
practice and the directions that provincial legislation should take.
Analysis of input from a series of focus groups conducted for the federal
government’s Policy Research Initiative found that most people would consider
working past retirement if it is in a job they enjoy, with reasonably flexible
hours and if they continue to enjoy relatively good health. The greatest
challenge is that most focus group participants do not consider their current
jobs as meeting the criteria for continued employment. Those in the upper
socio-economic levels reported that their jobs are too stressful and those in
the lower income groups find their jobs to be monotonous and physically
demanding. Self-employment is cited as an attractive alternative.
68 And, it
would appear that a growing number of older entrepreneurs (age 55 and over)
are doing just that. A study by the CIBC reported that the number of small
firms run by “seniorpreneurs” has risen by 30% since early 2001. These older
entrepreneurs account for one in four self-employed Canadians and almost a
66 Policy Research Initiative. “Population Aging and Life-Course Flexibility: The Pivotal Role of Increased Choice
in the Retirement Decision.” Discussion Paper. March 2004
67 Jonathan R. Kesselman. “Mandatory Retirement and Older Workers: Encouraging Longer Working Lives.”
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary. No. 200, June 2004.
68 Policy Research Initiative. “Views on Life-Course flexibility and Canada’s Aging Population.” July 2004.
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third of the workforce over the age of 55.
69 Policies aimed at making these
transitions easier could make a significant contribution.
Workplace Flexibility 
In the spirit of increasing the average age of retirement, strategies complementary
to the abolishment of mandatory retirement are needed. Helping older workers
remain in the workforce longer will require changes in attitude, programs and
practices supported by innovative policies to accommodate older workers.
Most of these revolve around providing greater choice, flexibility, control and
options that take into account individual circumstances and the complexities
of older workers’lives. The emphasis is on quality of life and achieving balance
between work, family life and social responsibility.
Flexible work arrangements can facilitate the retention, re-entry or gradual
phased retirement of older workers in the workforce. Some of the more common
examples of flexible work arrangements can include job-sharing, flex-time,
reduced hours, special assignments, temporary work, consulting work and
telecommuting.
Implementation of phased retirement may require reforms and adjustments
to pensions and other contributions that favour full-time employment or provide
financial disincentives for continuing to work after a target age. Changes to the
Income Tax Act, which does not permit employees to simultaneously contribute
to and receive benefits from an employer-sponsored pension plan, are also
necessary if phased retirement is to become a meaningful or alternative reality.
Creative policy and open-mindedness can get us around these barriers. The
Canadian Policy Research Network’s study on labour force aging cites the
successful negotiation of the New Brunswick government, the province’s nurses
union and the Canada Revenue Agency that allows the province’s nurses to
take a phased retirement option while still contributing to their pension plans.
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Life Course Flexibility
Current policies and practices regarding work are based on the traditional life
course that follows a particular chronologic order and timing of transitions from
education to work life to retirement and inevitably to death. In a more modern
and less predictable world, this model seems outdated. The Policy Research
Initiative’s (PRI) project on Population Aging and Life Course Flexibility is
studying the potential benefits of better flexibility in how individuals organize
and allocate their time within their educational, work, care-giving and leisure
timelines. Such a methodology examines the trade-offs of greater flexibility
(i.e., time off for education, skills upgrading, vacation, child care or elder care)
during a person’s prime working years in the context of a longer life period.
Policy instruments to implement life course flexibility, having built-in neutralizers
against social downloading, can be introduced. 
69 “The new boom in business.” Ottawa Citizen. September 16, 2004. p. B1.
70 See note 50, p. 36.
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Outcomes of Raising the Retirement Age
The PRI project looked at how much longer people would have to work to offset
the potentially negative economic effects of population aging. It cites the
study by Fougère et al. (HRSD, 2004) which found that GDP per capita could
fall by over 14% if the median age of retirement remained at its 2001 level.
Interestingly, real GDP per capita could increase by 3.5% if the effective age
of retirement was increased by only one year. If the average retirement age
was increased from its 2001 level to 65 years of age, real GDP per capital
could be 12% higher. The PRI project found that extending work life by three
years would more than offset labour supply shortages due to population aging
over the next two decades.
71
On the other hand, the Global Aging Initiative study forecasts sharp
increases in retirement age if countries rely on this factor alone to keep the
elderly dependency ratio constant at the 1995 level. In Canada, the retirement
age would need to rise significantly between 2010 and 2030 and by 2050 would
need to be at 76 years of age if no other strategies were concurrently pursued.
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Increasing Productivity
It has long been recognized that if we can improve productivity, we can
produce a greater volume of goods and services with equivalent, lesser or
proportionally less resources. Productivity growth is influenced by interactive
factors, which include ability of workers, technology and capital investment.
Advancements in technology are expected to continue to diminish the need for
physical human effort in favour of accentuating the use of human knowledge,
skills and aptitudes in intellectual pursuits. It makes sense for technology to
also better accommodate the needs of the older worker and thereby improve
productivity (e.g., more accessible workplaces, larger screen computer monitors,
communications technology for the hearing impaired, ergonomic work spaces).
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Overall, any efforts to make the workplace a healthier place should improve
productivity.
The area that needs the greatest attention is investing in human capital and
specifically skills acquisition. With technological innovation and globalization,
today’s economy is undergoing constant transformation. Corresponding changes
in the workplace require flexible and adaptable workers who have the education
and training to take on new opportunities, to handle job turnover and to transition
from one job to another. In 2002, Canada launched a 10-year Innovation Strategy
aimed at moving Canada to the front ranks of the world’s most innovative
countries. While this is a positive development, there have been a number of
competing priorities for the federal government. It is timely to put this higher
on the policy agenda, particularly as we look to developments to the south.
The U.S. Department of Labour has recently announced the establishment of
an innovative program, the High Growth Job Training Initiative, which will
71 See note 66, pp. 12 – 14.
72 See note 7, p. 56 and 139.
73 See note 57, pp. 54 – 56.
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provide training for workers in high-growth industries and occupations. This
$23 billion program will target high job growth sectors, including construction,
automotive, health care, hospitality and transportation that will require
remodelled competencies for workers. Canadian policy makers are encouraged
to find made-in-Canada responses that will enable our workforce to be well
prepared and supported.
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The question of whether employers should invest in older workers is
sometimes raised. As we increasingly subscribe to the concept of life-long
learning and with the rapid changes in skill requirements, this question
becomes less relevant.
Recruitment Strategies
More proactive action must be taken in the health care and education sectors.
Specifically, policies, customs and protocol which undermine a profession’s
ability to renew itself must be revisited. In the face of existing physician, nurse
and educator shortages, it is unreasonable to expect a simple doctrine of supply
and demand to satisfactorily address anticipated shortages. Specific strategies
to recruit and certify greater numbers of these professionals are past due and
resources must be devoted to their development. Interestingly, communities across
Canada are actively attempting to recruit physicians, at significant expense,
from an already inadequate pool rather than working at growing the pool.
Similarly, continued exploration of the potential roles of nurse practitioners
and immigrant certification processes is encouraged.
74 “Here’s a U.S. Policy we should adopt.” The Ottawa Citizen. September 20, 2004.
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An important aspect of the aging population trend is the potential divisiveness
that may be created between generations. If we consider that the working-age
population may be increasingly called upon to support a growing proportion of
the population having a reduced individual output and requiring supplemental
care and support, it is conceivable that significant economic and social
responsibilities will be shouldered by younger generations. A reduction in the
active labour force could also represent a contracting tax base from which to fund
health care and public pensions at acceptable levels. As a result, governments
may be forced to increase taxes or borrowing, which in turn could reduce the
well being of future generations. Potentially compounding this situation will
be the younger generation’s eroded access to a reduced number of family
members available to provide care-giving to those requiring it. Many view
these cumulative responsibilities as a burden to future younger generations.
For others who view these obligations as the responsibilities of the younger,
we must concurrently acknowledge that these expectations are based on our
inherent values, life experiences, beliefs and attitudes. These attitudes are
shaped over time and affect the way in which we behave and how we view the
world. They influence consumer spending, preferences, acceptable behaviour
and the way in which we chose to live our lives. As we progress through
changing environments, these attitudes also continue to change, as does resulting
behaviour. Whether older generations will be an insupportable burden to younger
ones depends largely on attitudes lent to this issue now and in the future. 
Taxation and Future Generations
Through their research, Mérette and Fougère explain that “in the context of
population ageing (sic), tax-sheltered private pension plans are also likely to
generate important intergenerational effects.” Acknowledged as effective tax
deferral mechanisms, these plans can significantly build up over an extended
period of time. Inherently attractive is the ability to invoke the immediate tax
relief afforded by contributions to RRSPs/RPPs, while concurrently tax-sheltering
the growth in value of those plans, at least until they are withdrawn. In 1995,
it was estimated that the net revenue loss to government created by these
incentives represented approximately 3.5% of GDP. Over the years, contribution
limits have been raised and the Income Tax Act has been modified to encourage
increased saving for retirement. Coupled with a large baby boomer entrance
into the labour force and increased proclivity to optimize investment, these
plans have burgeoned. Although the mechanics of these plans and the benefits
Intergenerational Relationships 9
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to individuals are outlined in a later section of this paper, it is imperative at
this juncture to recognize that government will regain these lost, or more
appropriately coined, deferred revenues. For one, future government tax revenues
will be intensified by withdrawals made from, or paid out of, RRSPs and
RPPs. At the same time, there will be a diminishing proportion of non-seniors
contributing to these private pension plans, which will have the effect of
reducing the magnitude of afforded tax relief. While CGA-Canada would
defer discussion and more rigorous analysis of the revenue side of the equation
to future issuances, it is important in the context of this paper to concede that
there will be large infusions of cash and government revenue in future decades
resulting from these current incentives. These revenue streams will naturally
mitigate some or all of the pressures and concerns currently identified and more
time needs to be devoted to reconciling these contingencies. For the purposes
of our current discussion, we offer the following interesting facts:
•  In Canada, between 1981 and 2000, the most significant change in the
composition of assets occurred in RRSPs. The amount in RRSPs in the late
1990s was six times larger than in the early 1980s, by far the largest increase
of any single asset. This contrasts sharply with total assets, which grew two
times over the same period. The proportion of families that had RRSPs
approximately doubled, from 28% to 55%.
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•  In 2002, an average contribution of $4,523 per individual was made to an
RRSP by an estimated 6 million Canadians.
•  Representing 52% of total savings of Canadians, it is estimated that $340
billion resided in RRSP investments at the close of 2002.
•  As baby boomers retire, tax-sheltered private pension schemes will generate
significant revenue arising from taxation of withdrawals from those plans.
As the population ages, tax-sheltered contributions (having a revenue loss
effect on governments) would be expected to grow more slowly, while the
taxable withdrawals will grow more quickly. This could compensate for the
projected increase in public spending on health care and pension benefits. 
Unfortunately, there is relatively limited information available regarding
intergenerational transfers that occur through inheritances and the corresponding
contribution to personal and public wealth of future generations. Currently
pegged at approximately $13 billion per year, we are certain that accumulated
wealth will be passed on to the next generations since, as they say “you can’t
take it with you.”
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75 Tarek M. Harchaoui and Faouzi Tarkhani (2004), “Shifts in Consumer Spending,” Perspectives on Labour
and Income (Catalogue No. 75-001-XIE, Statistics Canada).
76 Ian Melzer, “The Impact of Inheritances on the Housing and Mortgage Markets in Canada over the Next 10
Years,” Research Highlights, Socio-Economic Series, Issue 70, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation.
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The most recent data regarding wealth among the different age groups over
the last 25 or so years reveals that those nearing retirement have experienced
a significant increase of their net worth, while those under age 54 have seen it
shrink (see Figure 33). The impacts of unemployment and of shrinking or
eroding salaries have particularly affected the net worth of the youngest cohort,
those under 25, who are in a worse position as compared to their predecessors.
That being said, the clogging effect of the boomer generation cohort on young
people’s career opportunities also plays a significant part in that outcome. It
would therefore stand to reason that the upcoming scarcity of the labour force
will create not only more employment opportunities for the younger generations
but would likely generate large returns from investing in human capital. 
Attitudes 
Recent polling shows that an overwhelming majority of Canadians are worried
about having enough money to contentedly survive when they retire. However,
consumer spending trends in Canada over the last 20 years show a rise in
spending on discretionary items and a fall in the personal savings rate. This
shift in spending reflects changes in lifestyle, the economy and overall attitude
towards money. An increase in real incomes, the accumulation of household
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assets and a willingness to take on more debt have resulted in higher consumer
spending on discretionary items relative to basic necessities. In recent years,
the personal savings rate has fallen to historic lows while consumer debt levels
have risen, and the household home equity ratio has dropped to an all-time low. 
Table 6 below (as extracted from Statistics Canada Income and Expenditure
Accounts, 1981 – 2003) compares how people have relatively chosen to allocate
discretionary monies in the 1981 and 2000 calendar years. Importantly, the
reader is cautioned that percentage allocations are a function of discretionary
outlay only in each of the two years and that discretionary outlay is neither
constant as a function of total expenditures nor is it indicative of order of
magnitude. Rather, it shows how we have chosen to proportionally direct those
dollars which are discretionary. 
Twenty or more years ago, Canadian families tended to put their savings
into personal deposits and fixed-term investments. Today, they are investing in
mutual funds, stocks and other financial investments such as insurance, financial
planning and wealth management services. An aging population is naturally
seeking retirement products and supplementary health insurance coverage. In an
attempt to make up for lost time, counter-balance poor market returns of recent
years or simply to potentially optimize current and future returns, Canadians
have opted to invest in higher risk investment devices. The share of financial
services (stock and bond commissions, mutual funds, legal, accounting and other
services) in personal discretionary expenditure increased from 0.6% in 1981
to 2.2% in 2000, largely reflecting an increase in the net worth of households
and the growing portion of household assets accounted for by pension funds
reserves, stocks, mutual funds and money market funds. During that period,
the amount of money invested in mutual funds increased by an average of
23.5% annually, the fastest growing item in the consumer household basket.
Technological innovations resulted in new goods and services such as cable
television, electronic toys and games, cellular telephones, video equipment and
Internet services, and lower prices for many of these items. The new products
increased their share of discretionary spending from 1.5% to 3.6%, one of the
fastest growth rates within the consumer basket. During this period, computer
purchases experienced the second most rapid growth after mutual funds, and
the number of households connected to the Internet grew rapidly from 1997 to
2002, jumping from 16% to 51%.
In terms of the wealth effect between 1981 and 2000, the net worth of
households increased at an annual rate of almost 7%, about double the increase
in consumer expenditures (3%). In 2000, life insurance and pensions stocks
accounted for 68% of household financial assets, up 47% from 1981. Coming
at the expense of interest-bearing asset holdings (down 11% to 6%), deposits
(36% to 26%) and other financial assets (6% to 1%), much investment proclivity
has shifted to higher-risk vehicles. Previously mentioned, the most significant
change in the composition of assets transpired in RRSP holdings. 
Home ownership has also become more important. In 2000, housing
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accounted for 47% of non-financial household assets, up from 41% in 1981.
The increase in housing prices in recent years contributed to rising household
wealth and helped underpin continued strength in consumer spending. Rising
housing prices, combined with lower interest rates and financial innovation,
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have increased the borrowing capacity of households. In the past few years, the
increased borrowing secured against housing exceeded net new spending on
housing assets. This means that households, in aggregate, have been extracting
some of the equity in their homes for other purposes.
Illustrated in Figure 33, only those family units in which the major income
recipient was 55 years and older recorded an increase in median net worth
from 1984 to 1999; for all younger age groups, median net worth was down. The
median net worth of those family units in which the unattached individual or major
income recipient was 65 and older increased most significantly — by about 56%.
77
In addition, households have increased their borrowing through use of
credit cards and short-term loans, particularly lines of credit. A steady increase
in household debt since the mid-1990s, combined with a marked slowdown in
disposable income, has resulted in households in 2003 having $103 of debt
(consumer credit and mortgages) for every $100 of disposable income. Based
on Statistics Canada’s Survey of Financial Security, the debt load varies
among age groups. Overall, debt per $100 of assets increased from $14 to $18
between 1984 and 1999. As illustrated in Figure 34, the debt of the younger
age groups increased most significantly. For family units under 25, it was up
from $24 per $100 of assets in 1984 to $35 in 1999. The 25 – 34 year olds
owed $40 per $100 of assets in 1999, an increase of $10 from 1984.
77 “The Assets and Debts of Canadians: An Overview of the Results of the Survey of Financial Security,”
(Income Statistics Division Catalogue No. 13-595-XIE, Statistics Canada) March 2001.
   91
Understandably, some observers have viewed the surge in consumer spending
with apprehension. A decreasing rate of personal savings, high consumer debt
levels and greater reliance on asset appreciation-based saving has left the personal
sector somewhat more sensitive to swings in the residential real estate market
and to fluctuations in the stock markets than was the case in the past. This change
in household consumption patterns reflects tastes, preferences, technological
development and the structure of the economy. More relaxed attitudes towards
debt on the part of both the lenders and borrowers have also greatly influenced
consumer spending and overall attitude about personal finances, which is
drastically different from past generations when people had to pay for most
goods and services in cash and personal savings were a must.
Earlier in this section, we signalled that an overwhelming majority of
Canadians are worried about having enough money to survive when they retire.
Interestingly, the surge in consumer spending and overindulgence in consumption
would indicate the contrary. Increased access to credit and constant media
marketing have influenced our behaviour around spending, having consequence
to our lifestyles. Younger generations are relatively amenable to the trend and
are therefore more likely to be influenced by role models whose attitudes are
very different from those of their predecessors.
In his book, Bob Couchman speaks about a shift in attitudes among
Canadians from one generation to another shaping our society.
78 Mr. Couchman
grew up in the 1940s in a working-class neighbourhood and in his book he
describes his journey as both an observer and a participant in the inception and
evolution of numerous social programs. Of course, he grew up at a time when
it was considered one’s inherent duty to help alleviate the suffering of others
and government programs were viewed as a temporary helping hand for those
who were destitute. He explains that Canadian attitudes towards government
assistance began to change in the ’50s and ’60s with the expansion of the
social-welfare agenda and describes how programs intended to provide
short-term aid came to be viewed as a universal right, something all Canadians
were entitled to, regardless of need or financial circumstances. “The Canadian
character shifted from a moral sense of reciprocal obligation to a firm belief
in entitlement,” he claims.
In the minds of many experts and governments, the innate support systems
which traditionally worked relatively well in supporting troubled or disadvantaged
individuals had become faulty and outdated. Seen as an unfashionable solution,
we began to introduce public social programs for all people rather than services to
those living exceptional circumstances such as temporary job loss and debilitating
illness or injury. With this change has come a heightened sense of cultural
privilege, one based on rights and expectations, rather than one based on
personal duty and self-reliance. 
In fact, the sense of entitlement or right is seen by some as having been
the one largest proponent for the current program principle of universality.
78 Bob Couchman, Reflections on Canadian Character.
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Ignoring potential exposure to outright abuse of certain programs (i.e. fraud and
misrepresentation), we can certainly recognize that the principle of universality,
regardless of level of individual distress and ability to alleviate, can encourage
people and corporations to seek resources they do not really need or that should
typically be personally remedied with less reliance on government. It is a
behaviour which has placed significant pressure on public deficits, attracting
further debt servicing charges and one which can be inverted with more
responsible personal and political behaviour. Our forefathers understood the
need for spending deficits in time of war or disaster, but did nevertheless insist
on repayment of debt as economies adjusted. These events were true human
threats requiring immediate attention and ones which called for responsible
action, oftentimes imposing personal deprivation. This deprivation might
today be seen as barbaric given the current framework and the attitude to
financing. Whether it is at a global, national or personal level, we are compelled
to revisit our attitudes towards the use of credit and to question the true and
complete cost of such a liberty. Universality and its enjoined self-interest may
well have gone astray as we have pursued a doctrine of entitlement over a
character of personal reciprocal obligation.
Whether we agree or disagree that changing attitudes are a good thing,
there is little doubt that they affect consumer choice and public policy. In so
doing, society is reshaped in ways that generate profound and far-reaching
changes affecting us all. 
Adapting to New Realities as Generations Mature
As we observe changing attitudes, we recognize that demography does not
influence society in a vacuum. Undoubtedly, the baby boomers, as the largest
age group cohort, have had a tremendous influence on society’s evolution.
Particularly important is that new attitudes that redefine what is acceptable
and unacceptable have been formed, as too have been financial planning
behaviours.
Social events, including the women’s liberation movement, increased rates
of divorce and greater acknowledgement of rights of same-sex partners have
brought us to redefine men’s and women’s roles in society. Definitions of family,
couples, marriage and workplace are constantly evolving. As well, correlating
attitudes respecting aging are surfacing while refusal of the boomer generation
to act like “old people” demonstrates that we are redefining what is old.
Maybe this has been too long in coming. 
Because “older” people today are behaving differently than those of past
generations, the predictive power of age is diminishing. The boomer generation,
having been such a central focus of society for their entire lives, is not likely
to move quietly into retirement or into obscurity. Boomers may work less hours
and take on different jobs that better accommodate lifestyle, but having been
the greatest proponents of choice, they are not likely to accept diminished
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opportunity to actively participate in society or to influence it. Therefore, as
we attempt to predict the future of younger generations, we must also consider
the presence and anticipated behaviours of this new type of older persons who
continue to fundamentally alter society.
This does not mean that the younger generations will be relegated to the
shadows of this senior-dominated culture. Rather, they themselves will be
subject to new realities as they mature and evolve which will be quite different
from what their predecessor generations have experienced. If we consider that
parents now maintain responsibility for their children well into adulthood and
that the generation gaps seem to get narrower today, it is quite conceivable that
the system of reciprocity that exists within families will get stronger and that
the willingness and capacity of families to provide supports for older family
members may not be compromised despite the fact that we have fewer children.
More often than not, it is not the number of children that will determine the
amount of support provided to older family members but rather the quality of
the relationship that existed between them.
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Most adult people, at one time or another, have thoughts and/or even concerns
about retirement. This is both natural and responsible. Less common, however,
is that very few of us ever actually sit down with the expectation of designing
a concrete and manageable action plan. In fact, many of us might even have
difficulty describing our current financial positions, let alone our expected
positions in 20 or 40 years. Equally alarming is that many of us cannot
describe what we are going to do with our time for those potential 25 to 40
post-retirement years. Some might suggest that playing golf, travelling or
enjoying some other activity that could not be pursued while working will
preoccupy their time. Anecdotal evidence does nevertheless reveal that if you
have not done any of these things during your working life, there is a fair
probability that you will not partake in these activities when you retire.
Interestingly, we have also witnessed that the inclination of people to behave
in a certain way tends to change over time as they age. We have all experienced
changes that shift our interests as we mature. For example, some of us might
notice that playing pick-up hockey or partaking in an artistic painting class
was very important to us a few short years ago but does little now to stimulate
us. This need not be the case, but we can expect to experience or witness this
phenomenon in our lifetimes. 
How we choose to utilize our leisure hours is, of course, a personal choice
and may also be affected by health, our resources and our unique life scenarios.
All of these life realities are beyond the scope of this discussion and frankly
not subject to public scrutiny. Therefore, we will start from the premise that
individuals know what is best for them and will focus our discussion on financial
considerations. What is most important for our discussion is that people adopt
a strategy which embodies the things that they need to provide for at retirement
and that permits them the flexibility to reserve some resources to reasonably
pursue the leisure activities of their choice. While financial and lifestyle planning
can become an intricate, evolving and emotional subject, it is CGA-Canada’s
view that the best approach is to plan for and design a strategy which is
responsive, reasonable and flexible enough to adapt to, changing circumstances.
Equally important, these plans must be realistic if we are to align our economic
circumstances to our life goals. Perpetually reshaped by an array of competing
priorities, changing motivations and life-experience manifestations, it remains
advantageous to inventory our circumstances and priorities so that we can, at
minimum, cognitively manage our lives. Without becoming obsessed by it or
becoming paralyzed by it, focused efforts must be made.
Encouragingly, it is seldom too late to plan for retirement. While some might
posit that the uncertainty of the future discourages us from taking meaningful
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action, we hope that previous sections have gone some distance in alleviating
concerns. Better understanding that the consequences of past public decisions
have impacted the state of our futures and that the social reforms of today will
cause consequences onto others and for future generations, it is imperative
that we not simply ask government to remedy all that ails us as we forge
towards our twilight years. In short, it is a joint undertaking wherein Canadians
must rally to promote government policy which provides a minimum standard
of living to all while meaningfully allowing Canadians to assume fuller
responsibility for and greater independence in their lives. Public uncertainty
and cause-and-effect realities are not new. Rather, we are living an event which
accentuates the need for planning by stakeholders. That planning is a mutual
undertaking wherein government, communities and the individual assume
responsibility for different and complementing elements of the whole. Towards
that end, we will devote some time in this section to outline the most popular
and well-known programs available in Canada today. They can become the
base from which Canadians can design more comprehensive plans or make
further reaching decisions. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to speak to all of the income streams
available to Canadians today, we would commence our discussion with the
recognition that every Canadian may have several income and cash flow sources
at retirement. These can include:
•  Government-administered sources
° Canada Pension Plan (CPP);
° Old Age Security (OAS);
° Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS);
° War Veterans Allowance;
° Employment Insurance (EI); and
° Provincial and municipal income assistance and services (welfare).
•  Company pension plans
° Defined benefit plan;
° Defined contribution plan; and
° Hybrid plan.
•  Registered Savings Plans
° Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP);
° Registered Retirement Income Fund (RRIF); and
° Locked-in Retirement plans (LIRA, LRSP).
•  Non-registered Savings Plans
° Canada Savings Bonds;
° Treasury bills;
° Canada bonds;
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° Provincial bonds;
° Term deposits;






° Equity in a business;
° Employee savings plan;
° Equity in home;





° Income trusts; and
° Foreign equities, securities, properties and pension income.
This is not an exhaustive list but one that is nevertheless intended to
demonstrate the breadth of considerations in the design of an individual
financial management plan. 
Given the nature of this paper, we will not delve into the intricacies of
financial planning or its constituent components in preference of deferring such
an undertaking to future publications which can more specifically deal with the
subject matter. We do consider it beneficial, though, to provide a brief description
of the more salient retirement income vehicles accessible to Canadians today.
On a practical level, we believe that this discussion can effectively serve as a
starting point from which Canadians can begin to examine more advanced
planning as earlier prescribed. On a more rational level, these discussions are
topical and relevant to the contents of this paper.
In the following pages, Canada Pension Plan (CPP), Old Age Security (OAS)
and Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) benefits and correlating eligibility
criteria are outlined. As the text attempts only to describe main aspects of the
plans, the reader is invited to contact the Department of Social Development
Canada or to consult the Department’s Web site at http://www.sdc-dsc.gc.ca
for greater detail and certainty. A discussion of Registered Pension Plans
(RPP) follows, as does an overview of Registered Retirement Savings Plans
(RRSP) and the enjoined Registered Retired Income Funds (RRIF). 
The subjects of War Veterans Allowance, Employment Insurance, various
welfare schemes, locked-in retirement plans, various non-registered savings
plans and liquidation of personal assets have been deliberately omitted. In
the spirit of expanding these considerations under separate cover in future
issuances of CGA-Canada, we would likewise defer the broader discussions of
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Canadian income distributions, spending patterns, effective debt utilization and
the subject of comprehensive financial modelling inclusive of estate planning.
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
The Canada Pension Plan was introduced January 1, 1966, and has since been
amended several times. For example, the CPP moved from a “pay-as-you-go”
scheme to fuller funding in 1998, a change which represents a significant and
favourable shift. At that time, contribution rates were increased and a new
investment policy was established and in 2000, CPP benefits were extended to
same-sex common-law relationships.
The CPP is a contributory plan administered by the Department of Social
Development Canada. Funds are managed by the Canada Pension Plan
Investment Board, which receives all contributions from employees, employers
and self-employed persons. The Board invests those funds and the benefit
payments are made in accordance with applicable legislation. Consequently, it
is important to note that the CPP is not funded from the general tax revenues
of the Government of Canada. 
Every person in Canada over the age of 18 earning salary must contribute
to CPP,
* with the employer remitting a matching amount on behalf of that
employee. In effect, the employee pays one half and the employer pays the other
half. For obvious reasons, self-employed Canadians must necessarily contribute
both halves to the CPP. The 2004 rate of contribution for each of the employee
and the corresponding employer portion is 4.95% on the amount exceeding
$3,500 up to the Year’s Maximum Pensionable Earnings (YMPE) level, which
in 2004 resides at $40,500 (i.e. maximum respective contributions of $1,831.50),
for a total of 9.90% or $3,663 in aggregate. The amount to be contributed
for an employee is based on salary whilst the contribution of a self-employed
individual is based on net income and a non-refundable tax credit from both
(federal and provincial) governments is granted by Canada Revenue Agency
(CRA). The minimum salary level is established at $3,500, while the maximum
salary level is adjusted every January. Other sources of income, such as
investment income, are not relevant to the calculation.
The level of qualifying benefits to be received from the CPP is a function
of the length of time
** that the contributions are made by and on behalf of the
individual and the salary or earnings amount of the individual up to the maximum
YMPE ($40,500 in 2004). All CPP benefits, with the exception of the death
benefit, are subject to annual cost-of-living adjustments and are recognized as
taxable income in the year received. Exciting and convenient to some of the
world travellers among us, CPP benefits can also be paid out to plan members
anywhere in the world in the destination currency. 
* Contributions to CPP are made by workers working in all provinces with the exception of workers in the
province of Quebec, who correspondingly contribute to the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP).
** Canada has entered into social security agreements with several countries under which the periods of 
contributions from services performed in other countries may be included in meeting qualifying conditions 
in Canada. 
CPP benefits can be paid
out to plan members 
anywhere in the world in
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It should be noted that CPP benefits do not start automatically, as the
member must apply to the Department of Social Development Canada to receive
those benefits. To avoid delay in receiving benefits, it is generally recommended
that a member apply approximately six months ahead of the time to provide
notice of the member’s intent to commence receiving pension benefit. To qualify,
a person must have made at least one valid contribution and be over 65 years
old. In order to receive CPP benefits, the individual must also elect to cease
contributions and request his or her employer to stop withholding of CPP
contributions. Accordingly, under that situation, the employer is also exempt
from the requirement to make contributions. Thus, employers should typically
recognize a financial advantage of up to $1,831.50 annually (in 2004) when
employing individuals in receipt of CPP benefits. Importantly, and perhaps
less obvious, a person is not required to take leave of employment or remain
unemployed to qualify for benefits. To qualify for the maximum 2004 benefit
of $814.17 per month, a person will have typically earned more than the YMPE
for 30 to 35 years.
Following similar eligibility rules, a person can qualify for early retirement
benefits between the ages of 60 and 64 years of age. In order to receive the
reduced monthly benefit, a person should not have earned more than $814.17
(based on 2004 limits) in the month before and in the month of receiving the
benefit. Naturally, a member’s entitlement will be attracted by retirement but
certain circumstances such as reduced earnings resulting from an extended
unpaid leave of absence may also qualify an individual.
Once every year, the Department of Social Development Canada sends
“Your Canada Pension Plan Statement of Contributions” to those members
approaching qualification for benefits, on the premise that this group benefits
the most from this timely information. However, any plan member may request
this annual statement if so inclined. The Statement of Contributions discloses
identifying information of the individual, the annual contributions made to the
CPP by the member, the individual’s insurable earnings, an estimated amount
of pension benefit that would be payable if the member were eligible to
currently retire, the amount of disability benefit that the individual would be
eligible to receive and the estimated amount of survivor benefit, if applicable.
Should there be any dispute relating to eligibility or the level of benefits
between a member’s and the Department’s records, the member is entitled to
invoke an appeal process as provided by CPP legislation. The CPP program
also provides disability benefits
* to plan members. At the passing away of the
plan member, CPP further provides survivor benefits and one-time death
benefit as discussed in the following pages.
The employee and the employer are required to cease contribution to CPP
when an employee begins to receive disability pension from CPP or when a
member attains the age 70, even if the employee is still working. An employee
* According to the CPP legislation, disability must be severe and prolonged. Severe means that the condition
prevents one from regularly working at an occupation and prolonged means the condition is of a long-term
nature.
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over the age of 70 should apply for benefits as soon as reasonably possible in
order to avoid the loss of benefits. This is particularly important because the
maximum retroactivity permitted is one year.
In summary, the benefits available under CPP consist of the following:
•  Retirement Benefit
•  Disability Benefits, which include:
° Member Benefit
° Children’s Benefit





In 2004, a plan member eligible to receive the maximum benefit would receive
$814.17 per month, or $9,770.04 per year, as a retirement benefit, providing
that the person retires at the age of 65.
If a member elects to retire before the age of 65 years, benefits are reduced at
the rate of 0.5% per month (i.e. 6% per year to a maximum of 30%). Conversely,
if retirement is taken after attaining the age of 65 years but up to age 70 only,
there is an augmentation of benefits of 0.5% per month (i.e. 6% per year to a
maximum of 30%). 
For example, if a person applies for benefits at the age of 63 years, the
retirement benefit would be reduced by 12% (2 x 6%) to $8,597.64 per year.
On the other hand, a member opting to defer application for benefit to the age
67 years sees their retirement benefit increased by 12% (2 x 6%) to $10,942.44
per year.
Recognizing that benefit amounts will augment at a pace of 6% per year
during the period from the age of 65 to 70 years to the predefined maximum
of 30% assuming deferral of the benefit, it is conceivable that some Canadians
are better served to defer collection of benefits. The decision to do so will, of
course, be mitigated by the individual’s alternative income streams and their
personal assumptions of their own anticipated longevity. Deferral can only be
advantageous up to 70 years of age, as no further augmentation accrues to
the member after that age. Therefore, based on the current provisions in the
CPP Act, every eligible Canadian over the age of 70 not receiving the CPP
retirement benefit should immediately apply as there is no personal advantage
to forfeiting the benefit.
CPP Disability Benefit 
Disability benefits consist of the following:
• Member  Benefit
In 2004, a plan member who is eligible to receive the maximum retirement
every eligible Canadian over
the age of 70 not receiving
the CPP retirement benefit
should immediately apply
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benefit receives $992.80 per month, or $11,913.60 per year, as a disability
benefit in the event that she or he becomes disabled before the age of 65.
Accordingly, a person eligible to receive a lower amount of retirement benefit
likewise receives a lesser disability benefit. It should be noted that a member
may receive either the Retirement Pension or the Disability Pension, but in
no circumstance can concurrently collect both.
• Children’s  Benefit
The Children’s Benefit is available to children of the disabled member who
are under the age 18 or between 18 and 25 and in full-time attendance at a
recognized educational institution. In 2004, the maximum benefit amount
per child is $192.68 per month. 
Survivor Benefits 
There are three types of survivor benefits, as follows:
• Death  Benefit
The Death Benefit is a one-time lump sum payment of $2,500 (in 2004) to
be made to the estate of the deceased member or, where there is no estate, to
the next alternate recipient in the successive queue of the person responsible
for the funeral expenses, the surviving spouse or the next of kin.
•  Survivor’s Pension
The Survivor’s Pension is paid to the legal spouse of the deceased member.
For a plan member who had been in receipt of the maximum 2004 retirement
benefit, the survivor’s benefit is $454.42 per month, or $5,453.04 per year,
if the surviving spouse is less than age 65. Where the surviving spouse is 65
or more years of age, the benefit is $488.50 per month, or $5,862.00 per year. 
• Children’s  Benefit
The Children’s Benefit is available to children of the deceased member
who are under the age 18 years or between 18 and 25 and in full-time
attendance at a recognized educational institution. In 2004, the amount of
benefit per child is $192.68 per month, or $2,312.16 annually. 
Members anticipating eligibility for CPP benefits or having enquiries relating
to changing circumstances are encouraged to make contact with the Department
of Social Development Canada for greater detail and administrative guidance.
Noteworthy are the restrictions relating to the combination of qualifying benefits
and the further provisions of pension sharing and credit splitting, which may
also be of pertinence to some readers.
Sharing permits spouses and common-law partners, should they wish to
share pension credits, to receive a portion of the other’s pension. Under this
option, the overall benefits remain unchanged but the total income tax payable
            102
on those benefits could be strategically minimized.
Credit splitting, an option available when a marriage or common-law
relationship ends, permits pension credits built up while living together to be
equally divided by the couple.
Old Age Security (OAS) 
The Old Age Security Act came into force in 1952 and has been subject to
several amendments over time. For example, in 1975, the Spouse’s Allowance
was established and in 2000, OAS benefits were extended to same-sex
common-law relationships.
Unlike the CPP, OAS is not a contributory plan and is therefore funded
from the general tax revenues of the Government of Canada.
Available to Canadians over the age of 65 years meeting the defined residency
requirements, the OAS benefits can be initiated by making application to the
Department of Social Development Canada. For the receipt of OAS, having
worked in Canada is not a determining factor and the applicant need not have
retired. A person who has lived in Canada for more than 40 years subsequent
to the age of 18 years is entitled to receive up to the maximum benefit.
OAS payments are recognized as taxable income and are therefore subject
to both federal and provincial income taxes. Also, once OAS payments have
been approved, the pension payments may be made to the beneficiary anywhere
in the world in the destination currency, provided the recipient has lived in
Canada for at least 20 years after the age of 18 years. Like CPP, all OAS benefits
attract cost-of-living increases. Should there be any dispute related to eligibility
or the amount of benefits between the resident and the Department’s records,
the individual can invoke an appeal process provided under OAS legislation.
Based on eligibility, OAS provides basic pension, Allowance and Survivor’s
Allowance benefits as follows:
• Old Age Security Pension Benefit
In 2004, a resident 65 years of age or over eligible to receive the maximum
OAS benefit receives $466.63 per month, or about $5,500.00 per year. The
level of benefit is not reduced if the total income of the recipient is less than
$59,790 per year. For amounts above the threshold amount of $59,790, the
benefit level is clawed back in the form of a recovery tax, wherein the benefit
gradually declines to zero at a maximum income level of $96,972.
The principal sources of income to be included in determining recovery
tax or claw-back are CPP or QPP benefits, company pension plans or
superannuation, foreign pension income, RRSP withdrawals or RRIF
income, employment insurance benefits, interest income, net capital gains,
dividends, income from rental properties and employment income.
credit splitting permits
pension credits to be
equally divided when a
marriage or common-law
relationship ends
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• Allowance 
Under the provisions of this program, a 60 – 64 year old spouse who has
lived in Canada for at least 10 years after the age of 18 years, married to an
OAS pensioner, is eligible for an allowance.
In 2004, the amount of the allowance is $827.87 per month, or about
$9,934.00 per year. The allowance is not payable if the recipient’s income
from all sources excepting welfare payments, OAS and Guaranteed Income
Supplement (discussed later in the paper) exceeds $24,864.
The sources of income to be included in consideration for the income level
cut-off are: CPP or QPP benefits, company pension plans or superannuation,
foreign pension income, cashed RRSPs, employment insurance benefits,
interest income, capital gains, dividends, income from rental properties,
employment and self-employment income. 
• Survivor’s Allowance
The survivor’s allowance may be paid to the spouse of the deceased OAS
pensioner who is between the age of 60 and 64 years old and has lived in
Canada for at least 10 years after age 18.
In 2004, the amount of the survivor’s allowance is $913.99 per month, or
about $10,968 per year. The allowance is not payable if the recipient’s
income from all sources except welfare payments, OAS and Guaranteed
Income Supplement (discussed later in the paper) exceeds $18,240.
The sources of income to be included in consideration for the income level
cut-off are: CPP or QPP benefits, company pension plans or superannuation,
foreign pension income, cashed RRSPs, employment insurance benefits,
interest income, capital gains, dividends, income from rental properties,
employment and self-employment income.
It should be noted that an individual may qualify for either the Allowance
or the Survivor’s Allowance, but not both.
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS)
Like the OAS, the Guaranteed Income Supplement is funded from the general
tax revenues of the federal government and is subject to cost-of-living increases.
Providing extra money in addition to the money provided via Old Age Security
to seniors in Canada who have low to modest income from other sources, the
GIS is subject to an income level cut-off. 
In order to receive the GIS, the main condition is that the resident senior
must be receiving the Old Age Security Benefit described above. To receive the
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supplement, individual must apply to the Department of Social Development
Canada every year.
As GIS payments are subject to an income level cut-off, it is conceivable
that a senior may not be eligible to receive the supplement in some years, but
depending upon circumstances, might be eligible at other times. Therefore, it
is the responsibility of the senior to apply when his or her annual income drops
below the threshold level. 
The table below provides the level of benefit and the cut-off income threshold. 
Table 7: GIS Benefit Entitlem
It should be noted that the benefits received from welfare, Old Age Security,
Guaranteed Income Supplement, and the Allowance are not included in the
determination of Income for computation of the cut-off.
The following sources of income are included in determining the eligibility
and the income level cut-off: CPP or QPP benefits, company pension plans or
superannuation, foreign pension income, cashed RRSPs, employment insurance
benefits, interest income, capital gains, dividends, income from rental properties,
employment and self-employment income.
Registered Pension Plans (RPP)
*
Company pension plans, otherwise known as Registered Pension Plans or
RPPs, have become one of the compensation features adopted by corporations
to enhance long-term competitiveness in the marketplace for human resources.
They are inherent to recruitment and retention strategies of many organizations
* For a richer discussion of Registered Pension Plans, reference may be made to CGA-Canada’s paper entitled
Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada issued in June 2004. 
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and as such have rightfully become viewed as part of the total compensation
package.
All RPPs are subject to provincial pension standards legislation which aims
to protect pension plan members while entrusting the employers, as the plan
sponsors, with a fiduciary role in the management of those plans. In many
jurisdictions, the employer is also the plan administrator and to that effect is
required to manage the plan with care, diligence and skill that a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of others.
From among the many important responsibilities that a sponsor undertakes to
fulfill, the duty to establish funding and investment policy for the administration
of the plan are paramount. In the discharge of its responsibilities, the sponsor
has a duty to implement policy which persists in keeping the pension plan
affordable while providing for a reasonable level of security onto plan members’
promised benefits. 
Ontario is the only jurisdiction in Canada that has a fund which guarantees
benefits to Ontario members whose pension plan is terminated and the plan
sponsor is insolvent. Albeit perhaps modest, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Fund
(PBGF) provides a level of benefits up to $1,000 per month. Financed with a
special levy collected from plan sponsors on the basis of their pension plan’s
funding level on a solvency basis, the better the funding level of the plan is, the
lower the levy is. Recognizing that the life cycle of any commercial enterprise is
finite and that termination of a business may be accompanied by plan insolvency,
this is a mitigating protection for plan members working in Ontario. 
This fund has been in place in Ontario for more than 20 years and one
might wonder why other provinces have not implemented similar funds. In
short, financially healthy sponsors often control well-funded pension plans
and see PBGF levies as an additional tax, while less healthy sponsors might see
it as an insurance policy and could be tempted to provide benefits that could
not otherwise be afforded. Although this kind of guarantee fund adds to the
security of pension benefits for members, it does extend the risks to Ontario
taxpayers, as the collective levies alone could not meet the long-term pension
obligations of a very large sponsor or a multiple number of sponsors. The
United States has a similar guarantee fund created under federal legislation
which guarantees part of the benefits relating plans terminated in deficit.
In essence, there are three common types of company pension plans in
Canada: defined benefit (DB), defined contribution (DC) and hybrid. A brief
description of each follows while reference to CGA-Canada’s Addressing the
Pensions Dilemma in Canada may be consulted for a richer discussion.
Defined Benefit (DB) Plans
Simply stated, DB plans provide for a predefined retirement income calculated
as a function of years of service and/or level of earnings. The DB plan may or
may not be a contributory plan wherein employees participate in contributions
to the funding of the plan via payroll deduction.
Registered Pension Plans
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Generally accepted as a superior form of company pension regime, DB
plans may be categorized into three types:
•  Flat benefit plans that provide a fixed dollar amount (e.g. $50 per month)
for each year of service at retirement;
•  Career benefit plans that provide pension at retirement, calculated as a
percentage (e.g. 1.5%) of earnings over the entire period of employment; and
•  Final average plans that provide a pension at retirement, based on a percentage
of earnings during the years before retirement (e.g. 2% per year of service
based on last or best five years of service).
Final average plans allow for full indexing of benefits up to retirement, while
flat and career benefit plans will tend to be improved on an ad hoc basis which
might or might not allow for full indexing of benefits up to retirement. Flat and
career benefit plans, which are generally provided in unionized environments,
tend to be improved regularly as part of the collective bargaining process.
Defined Contribution (DC) Plans
Defined contribution plans are regimes within which employees and their
respective employers/sponsors contribute a set dollar amount or predefined level
of funding (usually a percentage of earnings) to the plan. Contrary to DB plans,
the plan sponsor does not bear on-going responsibility to guarantee a defined
retirement income level and is consequently not subject to funding deficits. 
Given the complexity of DB plans, sponsor apprehension to assume sole
responsibility for plan deficits and sponsor concerns over surplus attribution,
there is a global trend towards the adoption of DC plans over DB plans. Within the
current social and legislative landscape, Canada has likewise begun to favour the
DC alternative which the U.S., U.K. and Australia have quickly migrated towards.
Employers are increasingly concerned about the supposed value or utility added
by being involved in the retirement planning of their employees. Increasingly, new
generations of workers are generally better educated and more aware of the issues
relating to financial planning for retirement. Instinctively, worker preference to
play a more active role in this respect has emerged and is expected to persist.
From the shareholder perspective, this furnishes an opportunity for management
to concentrate on operational business issues and to leave pension issues to
employees who can steward their retirement planning in keeping with respective
personal agendas. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that Canadian employers
will continue to move gradually towards DC plans. Time will tell as to how fast
they will move and whether they will all gravitate to a DC position. The ultimate
corporate decision to adopt DB, DC or a hybrid regime will of course be influenced
by motivation, or lack thereof, to assume the bearing of responsibility.
Also, factors such as increased costs due to increased longevity after
retirement (as discussed in earlier sections), volatility of costs, as well as the
current status of pension legislations and court cases, encourage plan sponsors
to move toward defined contribution plans.
it is reasonable to 
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Hybrid Plans
Hybrid plans are responsively crafted to blend features of both defined benefit
and defined contribution plans. In order to understand the motivation to pursue
hybrid plan designs, consideration of the relative pros and cons of each is in
order. Intuitively, we can appreciate that each type of plan, that is DB, DC and
hybrid, has its merits. DC is simpler to administer and lets employees control
their pension assets. DB, on the other hand, allows the employer to invest the
pension assets in a more efficient way (on the premise of better information and
access to superior investment vehicles) and carries with it an apparent guarantee
to a certain level of retirement income. DC plans, whilst addressing employer
concerns over costs and volatility of costs, create other challenges, such as
transferring significant risks to individual employees who may be ill prepared
to assume those risks or to make effective financial decisions. Furthermore,
benefits may end up being inadequate, either through insufficient contribution
or from poor investment returns. As a reasonable alternative to pure DC or
DB plans, a hybrid plan configuration will typically seek to establish some
equilibrium between the virtues of each. Therefore, hybrid plans attempt to
strike a deliberate balance between advantages and disadvantages associated
with the constructs of the respective DB and DC plan formats.
CGA-Canada’s June 2004 Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada
paper can be consulted by those having an interest in considering or introducing
hybrid plans.
Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP)
Subject to maximum annual contribution limits, an RRSP is a retirement
savings vehicle endorsed by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA)
* in which an
individual, the spouse or a common-law partner is encouraged to put aside
money for retirement. Under this program, contributions made to an RRSP are
tax deductible in the year of contribution. Consistent with this preferential tax
treatment, such amounts continue to grow tax-free until they are withdrawn.
That is, federal and provincial income taxes are payable only when withdrawals,
consisting of principal and interest, are made from the plan.
Section 146(1) of the Income Tax Act provides that the maximum RRSP
deduction limit for any year is set at 18% of the preceding year’s earned income
as reported on the individual’s income tax return. 
In computing earned income, the following are included:
• Employment income;
• Self-employment income;
• Net rental income; and
• CPP/QPP disability income.
* Earlier names of the CRA were Canada Customs and Revenue Agency and Revenue Canada.
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Earned income, however, does not include items such as:
• CPP/QPP pension plan benefits;
• OAS benefits;
• Interest income;
• Dividend income; and
• Capital gains.
As the limit is further restricted to a maximum of $15,500 for the 2004
taxation year, an individual can invest up to 18% of an earned income of up to
$86,111. The Canada Revenue Agency directs information to every taxpayer
in its Notice of Assessment, specifying the individual’s contribution “room” for
the following taxation period. It is particularly important to note that should
an individual not contribute up to the specified limit for any taxation year, the
unused contribution room is available for future periods and may be carried
forward indefinitely. Up to the allowable contribution room, an individual may
contribute to an RRSP at any time before conversion to a Registered Retirement
Income Fund (RRIF), which is discussed later in the section.
Various investment instruments, including term deposits, guaranteed
investment certificates and specified mutual fund units, qualify as eligible RRSP
holdings. For those inclined to assume greater responsibility for outcomes, or
expanded influence and control, are free to do so in the form of self-directed
RRSPs, which can be managed by the individual or by a professional of choice.
Under a self-directed RRSP, the financial institution provides administrative
services for a fee while the individual manages the assets (i.e. trade securities).  
A self-directed RRSP may only hold qualified investments. For example:
• Publicly traded stocks;
• Debt obligations such as bonds, debentures, bonds issued by Government
of Canada etc.;
• Mortgages;
• Money and deposits of money such as term deposits and guaranteed investment
certificates;
• Mutual funds;
• Warrants, rights and options;
• Royalty trusts; and
• Foreign securities representing up to 30% of the content of the total plan value. 
Registered Retirement Income Fund (RRIF)
*
Individuals are required to bring to termination their RRSP plans by the end
of the year in which they become 69 years of age. When terminating an RRSP,
the individual must select one of the three distinct alternatives available to
* This subsection describes only the salient aspects of the plan. For greater detail and certainty, the reader is
invited to contact the Canada Revenue Agency or to access the CRA Web site at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca.
the unused contribution
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      109
all plan holders:
1. The plan holder may withdraw the funds, and assume the full tax consequences
of the resulting recognition of the withdrawal amount in their annual income.
2. The plan holder may purchase an annuity which provides an income stream
for a defined period, such as:
• The plan holder’s lifetime;
• The joint lifetime of the plan holder and a spouse or common-law partner;
• A fixed or defined period; or
• A combinations of the above.
Under this scenario, annuity payments will be taxed as received and as such,
no portion of the converted RRSP plan is taxed immediately.
3. The plan holder may transfer the RRSP into a RRIF, which extends some
characteristics of the RRSP. Specifically, the funds in the plan and any
income earned on those funds remain untaxed until withdrawn in the form
of RRIF income. Based on the age of the plan holder or of a younger spouse
or common-law partner, a minimum amount must be withdrawn from the
plan each year until a maximum age of 94 years, whereat it becomes fixed
at 20% annually until the plan is fully depleted. Individuals have the option
of withdrawing in excess of the minimum, but will naturally pay taxes in
the year of withdrawal, as is the case with annuities described above.
In the event that an RRSP is not converted into an annuity or a RRIF in the
prescribed year, having attained the age of 69 years, the whole RRSP is required
to be cashed out. Resultantly, the cashed-out RRSP attracts income recognition
in that year and the corresponding federal and provincial income taxes.
Like self-directed RRSPs, a self-directed RRIF may also only hold qualified
investments. Those qualified investments are identical to those prescribed
above in the RRSP section. Important to note also, an individual can have more
than one RRIF (e.g. one RRIF might pay an annuity and another might be a
self-directed RRIF).
If at the conversion date, there is still contribution room available as
described in the RRSP section above, we would recommend that effort be made
to utilize such by contributing either to the individual’s own RRSP or into the
spousal RRSP as the contribution room and access to the consequential tax
relief will be lost forever. For RRSPs converted into RRIFs before 1993, the
schedule of minimal withdrawals are specified as old schedule while all RRIFs
thereafter affected must follow the withdrawal percentage of the new schedule.
The contents of Table 8, as replicated from the Income Tax Act Regulation
7308(3) and (4), provide old and new withdrawal schedules showing required
percentage withdrawals. For example, if the asset value at December 31, 2003,
was $100,000 and the taxpayer turns 70 years age in 2004, using the new
schedule, he or she must withdraw a minimum of $5,000 (5.00% x $100,000)
in 2004 and so forth. 
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The Bigger Picture
It is our hope that we have to some extent demystified the eligibility for, and
magnitude of, social income security programs. Far from exhaustive in outlining
a comprehensive financial planning strategy or in coupling these social programs
and traditional retirement plans to other personal income protection strategies,
the purpose of the discussion has been to provide an overview of the primary
federal social programs and two of the most common forms of private plans,
RPPs and RRSPs/RRIFs, available to Canadians. As a modest beginning to a
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more exhaustive planning process, the intent has been to clarify the provisions
of traditional retirement programs while establishing a basic framework from
which to launch greater individual exploration. 
CGA-Canada would wish to highlight the importance of these programs and
while it may not be apparent in the preceding discussion, would also wish to
stress that CPP, OAS and GIS are good deals for Canadians. Oftentimes, we will
hear criticism of these programs on the basis that benefit amounts to beneficiaries
are inadequate. On an absolute basis, the argument that social benefits alone
cannot sustain the holistic needs of an individual is relatively accurate.
Importantly, however, we must accept that these public programs are intended
to provide for a minimum standard of living to all Canadians and do not
profess to meet more generous levels of comfort. In comparison to the individual
contributions that we make to these programs, the return in the form of benefits
can be extraordinarily positive. 
In a simple search to support this claim, we have analyzed the Statement of
Contributions of a male individual selected at random. On the premise that this
individual could retire at the age of 65 in 2006, we found that the individual
who is projected to contribute a total of $25,283 between 1966 and 2006 could
rightfully lay claim to the maximum CPP pension benefit set at $9,770 per year
in 2004. Ignoring anticipated cost-of-living adjustments to the benefit amount,
and arbitrarily establishing life expectancy to 79 years (which is conservative
based on demographic predictors earlier presented in Figure 10 of this paper),
the individual could tentatively receive a total of $136,781 over the balance of
his life. Not a shabby return, even ignoring inflation adjustments made to the
benefit amount and possible eligibility for accompanying disability, survivor
and death benefits, afforded by the individual’s $25,283 contribution.
Expanding our analysis of the individual’s scenario to include an assumed
rate of return of 7% on premiums paid and a subsequently discounted rate of 6%
on retirement benefits to 2006 dollars, it is our estimate that the result continues
to represent a solid return to the individual. What we found is that our individual
under consideration will theoretically have contributed $62,510 year 2006
dollars and would receive $116,219 year 2006 dollars in retirement benefits.
Further extending our examination to consider the scenario as might be reasonably
experienced by a female member,it was considered rational to assume an arbitrary
83-year life expectancy. Naturally, extending life expectancy further improves
the benefit amount to $141,705 year 2006 dollars and the resulting benefit to
contribution ratio. The average benefit amount is $128,962 for both genders
combined. For those readers who are puzzled by the large differential between
contributions and benefits, we concede that the aforementioned contribution
amount ignores the employers’contributions of an equivalent $62,509 in 2006
dollars. While our analysis relies on estimates, our goal is to demonstrate that it
continues to be a good deal to the individual member. From a systemic point of
view, we would naturally be compelled to include both streams of contributions,
that is, those of the member and those of the employer.
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Admittedly, not all Canadians will qualify for the maximum benefit(s)
afforded by the CPP pension regime and can expressively dispute the above
analysis. While it can be accepted that a less advantaged individual will receive
less in absolute pension dollars, we are compelled to recognize that contributions
will likewise have been more conservative. Thus, the return on investment
remains relatively constant. It is also contented that the effects of OAS and GIS
further serve to level the playing field between the least and the modestly
advantaged. For obvious reasons, the more affluent of our society are not likely
to protest certain disqualification from GIS benefits and potential denial of OAS,
in full or in part, on the grounds of relative materiality to their station in life.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to contend that a form of discrimination is taking
place, seeing that they have most generously contributed to the general revenue
accounts of the government that provide for these very OAS and GIS benefits. 
As illustrated in Table 9 below, some 5.78 million people in Canada
enjoyed an aggregate of $2.4 billion in CPP/QPP benefits in July 2003.
Serving to contextualize our discussion, it is remarkable to consider that an
approximate $29 billion per year (in 2003) is being paid to Canadians in the
form of CPP/QPP benefits alone. 
In bringing this discussion to a close, it would be remiss to ignore the CPP
concerns levied in recent times by some financial commentators. In response
to these broader CPP solvency questions, we would affirm that we have not
conducted any investigation or analysis of projected funding and obligation
streams of the program. We would, however, submit that the Chief Actuary of
Canada has certified the CPP Investment Board’s ability to meet obligations
the Chief Actuary of
Canada has certified the
CPP Investment Board’s
ability to meet obligations
well into the future
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well into the future. Most recently, John McNaughton, President and CEO of
the CPP Investment Board, likewise confirmed that CPP is sound for 75 years.
Since 1998, the plan has operated under a steady-state financing model,
which requires that contribution rates be sufficient to adequately ensure the
plan’s long-term financial stability. The primary objective of this change from
pay-as-you-go has essentially been to render the plan’s financing a more
collective undertaking so that no individual or successive generation would be
required to disproportionately contribute. 
Complementing the public benefits afforded by CPP/QPP, OAS and GIS,
some individuals are further qualified to participate in, and benefit from,
employer-related RPPs. While a brief explanation of these regimes has been
earlier provided, the reader is invited to reference the Addressing the Pensions
Dilemma in Canada paper issued by the Certified General Accountants
Association of Canada released in June 2004. Available on the CGA-Canada
Web site at http://www.cga-online.org/canada, hardcopies can be also obtained
by contacting the Association at 613 789-7771 or at 1 800 663-1529. Table 10
provides a perspective of the magnitude of RPPs in Canada at the end of 2000.
Undoubtedly important to the retirement of many Canadians, plan members
are encouraged to understand the plans to which they may be part and of their
implications for members.
In and of themselves, the common social programs spoken of earlier
represent a safety net for all Canadians. As concluded by Janice Compton in her
2001 – 2002 paper “Determinants of Retirement: Does Money Really Matter?”,
for most people CPP/QPP benefits are only part, and not even the most important
part, of their retirement wealth.
79 However, complemented by RPPs and other
financial strategies, these programs can serve to provide a minimum standard
79 Janice Compton, “Determinants of Retirement: Does Money Really Matter?”, Department of Finance
Working Paper, 2001 – 02.
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of living or as strengthened retirement income prospect. The opportunity in
Canada to participate in personal RRSP contributions provides yet a further
level of retirement assurance. Increasingly popular over the years, an average
contribution of $4,523 per individual was made to an RRSP by an estimated
6 million Canadians in 2002. Largely attributable to tax-deferring inducement,
it is estimated that $340 billion, representing 52% of total savings of Canadians,
resided in RRSP investments at the close of 2002. 
Given the complexity of these various retirement vehicles, their interrelatedness
and their potential consequence on the lives of Canadians, it is imperative that
Canadians gain full appreciation of the options available to them. Given the
breadth of the subject matter, the process can be undeniably protracted, depending
on the current knowledge of the individual. Nevertheless, a genuine investment
of energy can greatly enhance the understanding and financial standing of an
individual and his or her family. As the individual progresses, they will be
naturally enticed into other considerations requiring attention such as disability
and life insurance, succession, tax and estate planning. Recognizing the diversity
of personal situations and of individual goals, plans must be tailored with the needs
of the individual in mind. Responsive to life circumstances, a comprehensive
plan should generally include end-of-life considerations as well. At the risk of
appearing morbid, an inclusive plan will typically speak to such matters as
funeral arrangements and of the rights, benefits and inheritances of executors,
successors and heirs. 
As time well spent, the process can be made simpler by consulting experts
who can provide information and advice. These individuals can range from
civil servants who participate in the administration of programs to independent
financial advisors and financial institution personnel, accountants, lawyers,
insurance brokers or other personal services consultants. Importantly, we would
close by stressing the importance of the individual’s/family’s role in the planning
and implementation processes. While technical and advisory reliance on experts
is promoted, we would encourage individuals to retain ownership of the selected
approach, respective outcomes and of the enjoined destiny.
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Many commentators and observers have held the view that the impacts of an aging
population are largely negative, occasionally even referred to as a catastrophe
in the making. While the realities cannot be ignored, there is increasingly
more informed discussion and debate that also includes more optimistic views
on these demographic conditions. On one hand, there will be some natural
self-correction afforded by current public policies, anticipated spending patterns
and wealth transference behaviours. On a second tangent, proactive and collective
strategy changes can be entertained in the spirit of effectively curtailing the
pessimistic dynamics associated with individual and population aging. In short,
a comprehensive framework which calls for Canada to take leadership in
changing attitudes, policies and practices at all levels and in numerous sectors can
enhance the degree of success with which we can expect to navigate the course.
Stemming from the findings of this study, it is the view of CGA-Canada
that there are positive actions that can be taken in the immediate future to
improve outcomes.
Health System Pressures
Responding to the needs of an aging population will arguably be the most
significant challenge facing our health care system and a major catalyst in
health system restructuring. Some proactive steps that can be taken in that
direction include:
• Health care leaders, with a view to cost containment, could commission
greater research into international health care practices in order to investigate
or otherwise validate Canadian experience. While the percentage of the
elderly population in the United Kingdom, France and Japan has been higher
than that of Canada, their total health care spending as a percentage of GDP
and on a per-capita basis has been less than that of Canada.
• In the spirit of building on the current pay-as-you-go health care system,
governments should consider the viability of establishing a seniors’ health
account for the purpose of allocating new money to the provinces in proportion
to the growth in their populations age 65 years and over. Under a pre-funded
regime, with revenues coming from current and future taxation correlated
to general revenue increases, reserves can be created to help meet the future
costs relating to seniors’ health care.
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• Concurrently, governments can likewise continue to explore the practicability
of introducing compulsory health insurance schemes to fund common and
specialty health care services. That is, rather than funding health care through
general taxation, health care premiums similar to those of employment
insurance can be levied based on sound actuarial practices. 
• Much of the disease, disability and dependence in old age is preventable,
treatable or manageable. Putting in place an integrated health service delivery
network for seniors’care ensures accessibility to appropriate geriatric care,
which in turn results in better outcomes for seniors and major reductions in
the use of hospital and long-term care services.
• Primary care reforms emphasizing access to specialized geriatric services
and multidisciplinary provision of care must be pursued with the intent of
promoting healthy aging, disease prevention, assessment, treatment and
care outside of a more expensive institutional purview.
• All levels of government must look seriously at workforce plans to supplement
the number of physicians, nurses and other health care professionals in
Canada. Issues and prospects include global recruitment and reciprocal
licensing, sponsorship and training subsidization. Particular attention must
be directed to growing the pool of qualified entrants to the profession and
to broadening the scope of practice. In concomitant fashion, ineffective
recruitment initiatives (i.e. physician searches) should be supplemented or
replaced by community-sponsored training allowances (i.e. contractual
training subsidies).
• Modern standardized cost-benefit models which capture the relationships
of intervention, technology, pharmaceutics, infrastructure and marginal utility
should be developed to assist in the decision-making and accountability
processes.
• Recognizing preferences of individuals to remain in their own homes,
potentially less costly home care alternatives which meaningfully reduce
hospitalization or postpone institutionalization should persist. With provinces
and territories modestly spending an average of 4 – 5% of health budgets
on home care, resources should be reallocated toward home care services
in the spirit of reducing the demands placed on more costly institutional
care. Including the expansion of community palliative care, these strategies
should seek to bolster resources and supports to informal caregivers. 
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Labour Supply Concerns
Equally important over the upcoming years will be the need for Canada to
become more progressive in addressing potential labour and skill shortage
concerns which have emerged as the aging debate has evolved. With an
anticipated increase of 9.5% in workforce participation between 2000 and
2010, which flattens out for two decades thereafter, Canada is well poised to
consider and introduce measures such as those following:
• Enjoined by greater recognition of the training and qualifications of
immigrants, government and employers can work together in recruiting
young immigrants having specific skills. Concurrently, policies which
promote greater immigrant workforce participation and wage parity must
be pursued.
• Recognizing that offshore outsourcing can be seen as a positive, or
alternatively a harmful, means of enriching Canada’s labour pool, a more
directed strategy must be developed to properly make effective use of
available domestic and foreign human resources. Over recent years, we have
witnessed increased reliance on outsourcing while at the same time we are
aware of domestic labour frictions which serve to underscore a continued
level of unemployment in Canada. A cognitive and harmonized effort to
reconcile these opposing realities is necessary if we are to maximize
domestic productivity while simultaneously benefiting from the intended
relief afforded by the workforces of other countries. 
• With a view to removing barriers, improvements in education, training
and labour force participation of traditionally under-represented groups,
including women, aboriginals, visible minorities and people with disabilities,
can be pursued. Meanwhile, efforts to neutralize the obstructions and
disincentives faced by those receiving social assistance or unemployment
benefits need be addressed if individuals are to be permitted the opportunity
to meaningfully contribute.
• Effectively serving to combat some currently anticipated shortages, Canada’s
education system must continue to promote flexibility such that academic
pursuits match the occupational aspirations of its students. Supported by
formalized preparatory training and responsive employer apprenticeship
programs, modern youth need not be thwarted by indifferent academic
regimes.
• Already recognized as an effective way by which to resist potential skill
shortages, Canada is well served to invert the current trend of early retirement.
While some countries are investigating the feasibility of altering the age
eligibility for public pensions, it is conceivable that Canada restrict its
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consideration to early retirement (age 60) provisions only given its current
experience. That is, given that our average retirement age is 61.2 years, it is
reasonable to study those dynamics prior to potentially including those 65
and over in one broad sweep. And while public pension eligibility may have
important ramifications, the options of eliminating mandatory retirement and
diminution of early retirement incentives likely hold the greatest promise.
• Flexible work arrangements such as phased retirement, workplace re-entry,
telecommuting, flex-time and job-sharing can facilitate retention. In the
spirit of promoting desired outcomes, governments and employers might
consider changes to corporate culture and pension rules. 
• Investment in human capital, specifically skills acquisition and renewal,
must be made to assist the workforce in meeting evolving needs. Intent upon
retaining valuable expertise while simultaneously encouraging employee
retention, workplace transition plans need embrace a greater emphasis on
revitalization of current employees. 
Intergenerational Relationships
As we have examined a significant volume of literature and observable
behaviour, we have also come to recognize the inherent opportunities of our
current structure and the cultural shifts which might better serve tomorrow’s
landscape. These include:
• While beyond the scope of this paper, CGA-Canada would encourage
reconciliation of projected increases in public spending with future
transferences of wealth and sources of increased government revenue
resulting from current pension constructs. 
• In light of more recent behaviours of Canadians to partake in higher risk
investment on the premise of superior return on investment, it would be
prudent to concede that such instruments may have devastating impacts in
times of poor economic performance. While they can form part of a balanced
portfolio, an element of conservatism is in order for those unable to withstand
the implications of inherent risks. 
• Analysis of behaviours in discretionary spending reveals reducing moderation
on the part of Canadians. In a time of highly effective marketing campaigns
and relatively relaxed access to borrowing, conscious efforts must be made
by Canadians to decipher the “nice to have” from the “need to have.”
• Hinged on a principle of greater personal and political behaviour, a character
of reciprocal obligation and increased self-reliance, policy and the attitudes
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upon which they are constructed must be reshaped with a view to a condensed
sense of universal entitlement. 
Social and Private Income Security Programs
Encouragingly, it is seldom too late to plan for retirement. While some might
posit that the uncertainty of the future discourages us from taking meaningful
action, it is imperative that we not simply ask government to remedy all that
ails us as we forge towards our twilight years. In short, Canadians must rally to
promote government policy which provides a minimum standard of living to all
while meaningfully allowing Canadians to assume fuller responsibility for and
greater independence in their lives. Public uncertainty and cause-and-effect
realities are not new. Rather, we are living an event which accentuates the
need for planning by stakeholders. That planning is a mutual undertaking
wherein governments and individuals assume responsibility for different and
complementing elements. Towards that end, we would advocate that:
• Recognizing that public or social programs are generally a good deal for
individuals, Canadians should be encouraged to recognize these social
programs as a reasonably modest starting point only and an essential safety
net, but not typically intended to serve as a panacea for fuller retirement
living or more generous levels of comfort.
• In the context of personal planning, it is CGA-Canada’s view that the best
approach for Canadians is to plan for and design a financial strategy that is
responsive,reasonable and flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances.
Equally important, these personal financial plans must be realistic if economic
circumstances are to be aligned with life goals.
• Personal financial planning should be approached as a mutual and
comprehensive undertaking wherein government, communities and the
individual assume responsibility for different and complementing elements
of the whole. 
• Given the complexity of various retirement vehicles, their interrelatedness,
and their potential consequence on the lives of individuals, it is imperative
that Canadians gain full appreciation of the options available to them in
order to most adequately tailor respective plans, while assuming ownership
for selected approaches, outcomes and of the enjoined destiny.
In keeping with our opening remarks, the dilemmas presented over recent
times can be mitigated by the consideration and introduction of modern
reforms that are made possible by the very conditions which have produced
unrest. Interestingly, while many of the notions discussed in this paper are
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intended to offset the prevalence of an aging population, we would contend
that these recommendations and others extend beyond that perspective. With
this in mind, CGA-Canada would advocate for improvements that seek to
remedy systemic weaknesses that are seen as hampering or threatening to the
quality of life of all Canadians now and into the future.
In closing, we would reiterate that no one strategy alone will deliver the
desired outcomes. Rather, our aptitude to harness afforded potential and to
mobilize a comprehensive and balanced tactic will define our collective success
in optimizing the ample opportunities before us.
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